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RIEMANNIAN GAME DYNAMICS
PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS∗ AND WILLIAM H. SANDHOLM§
Abstract. We study a class of evolutionary game dynamics defined by bal-
ancing a gain determined by the game’s payoffs against a cost of motion that
captures the difficulty with which the population moves between states. Costs
of motion are represented by a Riemannian metric, i.e., a state-dependent
inner product on the set of population states. The replicator dynamics and
the (Euclidean) projection dynamics are the archetypal examples of the class
we study. Like these representative dynamics, all Riemannian game dynam-
ics satisfy certain basic desiderata, including positive correlation and global
convergence in potential games. Moreover, when the underlying Riemannian
metric satisfies a Hessian integrability condition, the resulting dynamics pre-
serve many further properties of the replicator and projection dynamics. We
examine the close connections between Hessian game dynamics and reinforce-
ment learning in normal form games, extending and elucidating a well-known
link between the replicator dynamics and exponential reinforcement learning.
1. Introduction
Viewed abstractly, evolutionary game dynamics assign to every population game
a dynamical system on the game’s set of population states. Under most such dy-
namics, the vector of motion at a given population state depends only on payoffs
and behavior at that state, implying that changes in aggregate behavior are de-
termined by current strategic conditions. Such dynamics may thus be viewed as
state-dependent rules for transforming current payoffs into feasible directions of
motion.
In this paper, we introduce a family of evolutionary game dynamics under which
the vector of motion z from any state x is obtained by balancing two forces. The
first, the gain from motion, is obtained by adding the products of the strategies’
payoffs at x with their rates of change under z. This quantity is the measure of
agreement between payoffs and motion used in the standard monotonicity condition
for game dynamics.1 The second, the cost of motion, captures the difficulty with
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2 P. MERTIKOPOULOS AND W. H. SANDHOLM
which the population moves from state x along vector z; different specifications of
these costs define different members of our family of dynamics. These costs are
usefully represented by means of a Riemannian metric, a state-dependent inner
product used to evaluate lengths of and angles between vectors of motion. Accord-
ingly, the dynamics studied here, defined by maximizing differences between gains
and costs, are called Riemannian game dynamics.
The two archetypal examples of Riemannian game dynamics are the replica-
tor dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) and the (Euclidean) projection dynamics
(Nagurney and Zhang, 1997), both derived from fairly simple structures. First, the
replicator dynamics are derived from the Shahshahani metric (Shahshahani, 1979),
under which the cost of increasing a strategy’s relative frequency in the popula-
tion is inversely proportional to said frequency. Second, the projection dynamics
are obtained by measuring the cost of motion in the standard Euclidean fashion,
independently of the population’s current state. Other Riemannian metrics can
be used in applications where different strategies have clear affinities, allowing the
presence and performance of one strategy to positively influence the use of similar
alternatives.
The metric’s boundary behavior is the source of a fundamental dichotomy that
is best explained by looking at our two prototypical examples above. Under the
replicator dynamics: (i) the law of motion for every game is continuous; (ii) the set
of utilized strategies remains constant along every solution trajectory; and (iii) the
dynamics’ rest points are the restricted equilibria of the game – the states at which
all strategies in use earn the same payoff. In contrast, under the Euclidean projec-
tion dynamics: (i) the law of motion is typically discontinuous at the boundary of
the simplex; (ii) the set of utilized strategies may change infinitely often along the
same solution trajectory; and (iii) the dynamics’ rest points are the Nash equilibria
of the underlying game. Based on this behavior, we obtain a natural distinction
between continuous and discontinuous Riemannian dynamics, each category shar-
ing the boundary behavior of its prototype. In Section 4, we introduce a variety of
examples of Riemannian dynamics from both classes; then, in Section 5, we show
how these and other Riemannian dynamics can be provided with microfoundations
using suitably constructed revision protocols.
A basic aim of our analysis is to demonstrate that many basic properties of
the replicator and Euclidean projection dynamics extend to our substantially more
general setting. In Section 6, we show that Riemannian dynamics satisfy the ba-
sic desiderata for evolutionary game dynamics: they heed a payoff monotonicity
condition known as positive correlation, and they converge globally in the class of
potential games. In the latter context, Riemannian game dynamics also provide a
broad generalization of Kimura’s maximum principle (Kimura, 1958; Shahshahani,
1979). This principle states that when agents are matched to play a normal form
common interest game, the replicator dynamics move in the direction of maximal
increase in average payoffs, provided that lengths of displacement vectors are eval-
uated using the Shahshahani metric. Extending this principle, we observe that
Riemannian dynamics track the direction of steepest ascent of potential in any
potential game, provided that displacements are evaluated using the Riemannian
metric at hand.
Obtaining further results on stability, convergence, and global behavior requires
additional structure on our dynamics – and hence on the underlying Riemannian
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metric. This structure is provided by an integrability condition. In prior work on
game dynamics, such conditions have been imposed on the vector fields used to
convert the strategies’ payoffs into vectors of choice probabilities.2 By contrast, the
integrability condition employed here is imposed on the matrix field that defines
a Riemannian metric, requiring that it be expressible as the Hessian of a convex
function. We call this function the potential of the metric, and we refer to the
resulting dynamics as Hessian game dynamics.3 Both the replicator dynamics and
the Euclidean projection dynamics are members of this class. As we explain in
Section 7, Hessian dynamics are continuous when their potential function becomes
infinitely steep at the boundary of the simplex, leading to the distinction between
continuous and discontinuous Hessian dynamics.
The key tool that we employ for the analysis of Hessian dynamics is the Bregman
divergence (Bregman, 1967), an asymmetric measure of the “remoteness” of a given
population state from any fixed target state.4 By using the Bregman divergence as
a Lyapunov function, we prove global convergence to Nash equilibrium in strictly
contractive games and local stability of evolutionarily stable states under Hessian
game dynamics. We also show that certain distinctive properties of the replicator
dynamics in normal form games extend to all continuous Hessian dynamics – in
particular, the convergence of time averages of interior solutions to the set of Nash
equilibria, and the existence of simple sufficient conditions for permanence. Finally,
we show that strictly dominated strategies are eliminated under continuous Hessian
dynamics, a conclusion which does not extend to the discontinuous regime.5
Related work. There are very close connections between the dynamics considered
here and dynamics studied by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990), Hopkins (1999), and
Harper (2011). In order to have the machinery in place to make these connections
clear, we postpone this discussion until Section 2.3.
There is a more surprising connection between Hessian dynamics and models of
reinforcement learning in normal form games. Rustichini (1999), Hofbauer et al.
(2009) and Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010) show that if players track the cu-
mulative payoffs (or scores) of their strategies and choose mixed strategies at each
instant by applying the logit choice rule to these scores, the evolution of mixed
strategies is described by the replicator dynamics.6 Combining our analysis here
with that of Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016), we show that Hessian dynamics
derived from a steep potential function also describe the evolution of mixed strate-
gies under reinforcement learning. In addition to substantially generalizing existing
results, our analysis provides an intuitive explanation for the tight links between
the two processes. Section 8 describes these and other connections between Hessian
dynamics and reinforcement learning in detail.
2See Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007), and Sandholm (2010a).
3In the context of convex programming, gradient flows generated by Hessian Riemannian (HR)
metrics of this sort have been explored at depth by Bolte and Teboulle (2003), Alvarez et al.
(2004), Mertikopoulos and Staudigl (2018), and many others. Laraki and Mertikopoulos (2015)
also examine the long-term rationality properties of a class of second-order, inertial game dynamics
derived from HR metrics.
4In the Shahshahani case, this boils down to the Kullback–Leibler divergence, which has seen
wide use in the analysis of the replicator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995).
5See Sandholm et al. (2008) and Section 7.4.
6For related results, see also Börgers and Sarin (1997), Posch (1997), and Hopkins (2002).
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2. Population games and evolutionary dynamics
Notation. Let A = {α1, . . . , αn} be a finite set. The real space spanned by A will
be denoted by RA and we will write δαβ for the Kronecker deltas on A. We will
also write K ≡ RA+ for the nonnegative orthant of RA, K◦ ≡ RA++ for its interior
(the positive orthant), and RA0 = {z ∈ RA :
∑
α zα = 0} for the subspace of vectors
whose components sum to zero. Finally, in a slight abuse of notation, we will write
Rsupp(x) = {z ∈ RA : zα = 0 whenever xα = 0} for the set of vectors in RA whose
support is contained in the support of x ∈ RA.
2.1. Population games. Throughout this paper we focus on games played by a pop-
ulation of nonatomic agents. Our analysis extends to the multi-population setting
without significant effort, but we focus on single-population games for simplicity
and notational clarity.
During play, each agent chooses an action (or pure strategy) from a finite set A,
and their payoff is determined by their choice of action and by the proportions xα ∈
[0, 1] of the population playing each action α ∈ A. Collectively, these proportions
define a population state x = (xα)α∈A ∈ RA, and we write X = ∆(A) = {x ∈
RA+ :
∑
α xα = 1} for the set of population states (or state space) of the game. The
payoff to an agent playing α ∈ A when the population state is x ∈ X is given by an
associated payoff function vα : X → R, which we assume to be Lipschitz continuous.
Putting all this together, a population game may be identified with a set of actions
and their associated payoff functions, and will be denoted by G ≡ G(A, v).
A population state x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a population game G if
vα(x
∗) ≥ vβ(x∗) for all α ∈ supp(x∗) and for all β ∈ A. (NE)
If x∗ satisfies (NE) and is pure (i.e. x∗ = eα for some α ∈ A), it is called a
pure Nash equilibrium of G; if, in addition, (NE) holds as a strict inequality for all
β /∈ supp(x∗), x∗ is said to be a strict equilibrium of G.
A restriction of a game G is a population game G′ ≡ G′(A′, v′) that is defined by a
subset A′ ⊆ A of the original game’s action set and by payoff functions vα obtained
by restricting the original payoff functions to the reduced state space X ′ = ∆(A′)
of G′. If x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of some restriction of G, it will be called a
restricted equilibrium; as such, x ∈ X is a restricted equilibrium of G if all strategies
in its support earn equal payoffs.
Example 2.1 (Matching in normal form games). The simplest example of a pop-
ulation game is obtained by uniformly matching a population of agents to play a
two-player symmetric normal form game with payoff matrix A = (Aαβ)nα,β=1. Ag-
gregating over all matches, the payoff to an α-strategist when the population is at
state x ∈ X is vα(x) =
∑
β∈AAαβxβ .
Example 2.2 (Potential games). A population game G is called a potential game
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Sandholm, 2001) if there exists a potential function
f defined on a neighborhood of X such that
∂f
∂xα
= vα(x) for all α ∈ A and all x ∈ X . (2.1)
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Example 2.3 (Contractive games). A population game G is called (weakly) contrac-
tive (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009) if∑
α∈A
(vα(x
′)− vα(x))(x′α − xα) ≤ 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X . (2.2)
If (2.2) binds only when x = x′, G is called strictly contractive, whereas if (2.2)
binds for all x, x′ ∈ X , G is called conservative.7
2.2. Evolutionary dynamics. The term evolutionary dynamics refers to rules that
assign to each population game G a dynamical system on its state space X . This is
usually done by mapping each game to a law of motion, i.e. a differential equation
of the form
x˙ = V (x). (D)
In most cases, the motion field V (x) of (D) is defined by introducing a mapping
(x, pi) 7→ V˜ (x, pi) from state/payoff pairs to vectors, and then specifying that V (x) ≡
V˜ (x, v(x)). In what follows, we will focus exclusively on such dynamics.
To ensure that solutions to (D) remain in X for all t ≥ 0, V (x) should not point
outward from X ; formally, V (x) should lie in the tangent cone of X at x, defined
here as
TCX (x) = {z ∈ RA0 : zα ≥ 0 whenever xα = 0}. (2.3)
Under many evolutionary dynamics (including the replicator dynamics and other
imitative dynamics), the support of x(t) remains invariant under (D), implying in
turn that the interior of each face of X remains invariant under (D). When this is
the case, V (x) actually lies in the tangent space to X at x, defined as
TX (x) = {z ∈ RA0 : zα = 0 whenever xα = 0} ⊆ TCX (x). (2.4)
Clearly, for every interior state x ∈ X ◦, we have TX (x) = TCX (x) = RA0 .
A basic monotonicity criterion linking (D) with the underlying game requires
positive correlation between the strategies’ payoffs and growth rates. Concretely,
this means that ∑
α∈A
vα(x)Vα(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X , (PC)
with equality only if V (x) = 0.8 If (D) satisfies (PC), every Nash equilibrium of G
is a rest point of (D). For a detailed discussion, see Sandholm (2010b).
We provide two prototypical examples of evolutionary dynamics below:
Example 2.4 (The replicator dynamics). The quintessential evolutionary game dy-
namics are the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978):
x˙α = xα
[
vα(x)−
∑
β∈A xβvβ(x)
]
. (RD)
7Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) use the name stable games instead of contractive, but Sand-
holm (2015) proselytizes for the terms employed here. In convex analysis, condition (2.2) is called
monotonicity.
8This and closely related conditions are considered by Friedman (1991), Swinkels (1993),
Sandholm (2001), and Demichelis and Ritzberger (2003).
6 P. MERTIKOPOULOS AND W. H. SANDHOLM
Example 2.5 (The Euclidean projection dynamics). The other fundamental example
we consider is the Euclidean projection dynamics of Nagurney and Zhang (1997)
(see also Friedman, 1991, and Lahkar and Sandholm, 2008). These are defined by
x˙ = arg min
z∈TCX (x)
‖v(x)− z‖22, (PD)
where ‖z‖2 = (
∑
α z
2
α)
1/2 denotes the ordinary Euclidean norm on RA. Geomet-
rically, the dynamics (PD) are defined by taking the Euclidean projection of the
payoff field v(x) onto the tangent cone TCX (x). Since TCX (x) = RA0 on the interior
X ◦ of the simplex, we obtain the simple formula
x˙α = vα(x)− 1|A|
∑
β∈A
vβ(x), (2.5)
valid for all interior x ∈ X ◦. For an explicit formula on the boundary of X , see
Example 4.2.
2.3. Antecedents. The class of dynamics studied here is a substantial generalization
of both the replicator dynamics and the projection dynamics. We now describe
works from an assortment of fields that are antecedents of our approach.
The replicator equation (RD) for common interest games is a basic model from
population genetics (Schuster and Sigmund, 1983). The fundamental theorem of
natural selection, attributed to Fisher (1930), states that natural selection among
genes increases overall population fitness. Kimura (1958) introduced a correspond-
ing maximum principle showing that population fitness increases at a maximum
rate under (RD), provided that one imposes a certain nonlinear constraint on the
set of feasible changes in population frequencies (see Remark 3.2 in Section 3.3).
Later, Shahshahani (1979) and Akin (1979) put Kimura’s maximum principle on a
firm mathematical footing using tools from differential geometry – specifically, by
introducing a suitable Riemannian metric (see Section 3.2). The derivation of the
replicator dynamics in the latter papers provides a basic instance of the geometric
construction of Riemannian dynamics developed in Section 3.6, while our construc-
tion based on balancing gains and costs can be viewed as an extension of Kimura’s
analysis (cf. Remark 3.2).
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) model natural selection in populations of animals
whose traits are represented by elements of a continuous set. They assume that
all members of the population share the same trait x, except for an infinitesimal
group of mutants whose traits differ infinitesimally from x. The evolution of the
preponderant trait x follows a gradient-like process, moving in the direction that
agrees with the play of the most successful local mutants. To obtain variations on
this process, Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) use a Riemannian metric to define the
size and shape of the neighborhood of local mutants. When the trait space is X
and the fitness of mutant y takes the linear form
∑
α yαvα(x), they showed that
the evolution of x on the interior of X is given by
x˙α =
∑
β∈A
[
g−1αβ (x)−
∑
γ g
−1
αγ (x)
∑
γ g
−1
γβ (x)∑
γ,κ g
−1
γκ (x)
]
vβ(x), (2.6)
where g(x) is a field of symmetric positive definite matrices that defines the Rie-
mannian metric in question (see Section 3.2). Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) then
observed that under the Shahshahani metric, the system (2.6) boils down to the
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replicator dynamics (RD). As we shall see, (2.6) describes the dynamics stud-
ied in this paper at all states x ∈ X in what we call the minimal-rank case (cf.
Section 3.4).
In the course of analyzing perturbed best response dynamics (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998) and variants of fictitious play (Brown, 1951), Hopkins (1999) intro-
duced a class of game dynamics that are defined on the interior of X as
x˙α =
∑
β∈A
Mαβ(x)vβ(x). (2.7)
Here M(x) is a smoothly-varying field of symmetric matrices that are positive
definite on RA0 and map constant vectors to 0. Hopkins (1999) showed that the
linearization of these dynamics agrees with that of perturbed best response dynam-
ics up to a positive affine transformation. As a result, the local stability of rest
points of (2.7) agrees with that of the corresponding rest points of perturbed best
response dynamics with sufficiently small noise levels. As we show in Appendix A.1,
the dynamics (2.6) satisfy Hopkins’ conditions; conversely, all dynamics satisfying
Hopkins’ conditions can be expressed in the form (2.6). Thus, on the interior of
X , the dynamics of Hopkins (1999) are equivalent to the dynamics studied here
(Proposition A.3).
More recently, Harper (2011) used ideas from information geometry to define
generalizations of the replicator dynamics, and employed concepts from Riemannian
geometry to state and prove certain properties of the induced dynamics. Ignoring
boundary issues, these dynamics are an important special case of ours – specifically,
the class of separable dynamics that we introduce in Example 4.4.
Finally, we note here that there is a surprising and deep connection between
the Hessian subclass of Riemannian game dynamics and a model of reinforcement
learning recently examined by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016). We explore
this relation in detail in Section 8.
3. Riemannian game dynamics
3.1. Gains, costs, and dynamics. We now define the dynamics we study as balancing
a gain from motion, determined from the game’s payoffs, against a cost of motion,
a new primitive that captures the difficulty of motion along a given direction from
a given state. To streamline our presentation, we focus below on interior states
x ∈ X ◦ ≡ int(X ), postponing the treatment of boundary states until the machinery
needed to handle them is in place.
Given a population game G(A, v), the gain from motion from state x ∈ X along
z ∈ RA is defined as
Gv(z;x) =
∑
α∈A
vα(x)zα, (3.1)
In words, the gain of motion measures the agreement between payoffs and vectors
of motion as in the standard monotonicity criterion (PC). For an alternative inter-
pretation, recall that the defining property (2.1) of a potential game with potential
function f can be expressed as∑
α∈A
∂f
∂xα
zα =
∑
α∈A
vα(x)zα for all z ∈ RA and all x ∈ X . (3.2)
The left-hand side of (3.2) is the rate of change in the value of potential as the state
moves away from x along z. Viewed in this light, the gain Gv(z;x) extends the
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notion of “the rate of increase in potential” to games that do not admit a potential
function.9 In particular, the gain captures the alignment between the direction of
motion z and the payoffs at state x; it is also linearly homogeneous in z, so it grows
linearly as one increases the speed of motion in a fixed direction.
By contrast, the cost of motion C(z;x) is a primitive that represents the intrinsic
difficulty of moving from state x along a given displacement vector z. For concrete-
ness, we assume that the costs of motion are positive, smoothly varying with the
population state x, and quadratic in z. It is convenient to define costs C(z;x) for
states x in the positive orthant K◦ ≡ RA++ and for displacement vectors z in RA.10
Then since costs are positive and quadratic in z, the cost function can be expressed
as
C(x; z) =
1
2
z>g(x)z, for all z ∈ RA and all x ∈ K◦. (3.3)
where g is a smooth assignment of symmetric positive definite matrices g(x) to
states x ∈ K◦.
To use the above to define the dynamics at interior population states, we posit
that the vector of motion from state x ∈ X ◦ maximizes the difference between the
gain of motion Gv(x; z) and the cost of motion C(x; z), subject to feasibility:
x˙ = arg max
z∈RA0
[Gv(z;x)− C(z;x)]. (3.4)
We refer to the dynamics (3.4) as Riemannian game dynamics, for reasons that
we will soon make clear. Before doing so, we show how the leading examples of
these dynamics are derived from the ansatz (3.4) through suitable choices of the
cost function C(x; z):
Example 3.1. A straightforward, state-independent choice for the cost of motion is
C(x; z) =
1
2
∑
α∈A
z2α. (3.5)
To solve the resulting maximization problem in (3.4), consider the Lagrangian
Λ(z, µ;x) =
∑
α∈A
[
vα(x)zα − 1
2
z2α − µzα
]
, (3.6)
where the last term is associated with the motion feasibility constraint
∑
α∈A zα =
0. A direct differentiation gives the optimality condition zα = vα(x) − µ, and the
feasibility constraint yields µ = |A|−1∑α∈A vα(x). Substituting back into in (3.4)
yields
x˙α = vα(x)− 1|A|
∑
α∈A
vα(x). (3.7)
As we discussed in Section 2 (cf. Example 2.5), the system (3.7) describes the
(Euclidean) projection dynamics of Nagurney and Zhang (1997) on X ◦.
9The logic here is similar to the original motivation for the definition of contractive games,
which extends the idea of a game with a concave potential function to games that do not admit
a potential (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009). The gain (3.1) is referred to as the “aggregate gross
gain” by Zusai (2018) in his general analysis of Lyapunov functions for contractive games and
evolutionarily stable strategies.
10We can interpret K◦ as the set of population states that could arise if the population size
were allowed to vary. We could instead define costs only for states in X ◦ and displacement vectors
in RA0 , at the price of additional abstraction: see Remark 3.1 below.
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Example 3.2. For a basic state-dependent choice for the cost of motion, let
C(x; z) =
1
2
∑
α∈A
z2α
xα
(3.8)
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem in (3.4) is now
Λ(z, µ;x) =
∑
α∈A
[
vα(x)zα − z
2
α
2xα
− µzα
]
. (3.9)
Differentiating now yields the optimality condition zα = xαvα(x)− µxα, and feasi-
bility implies that µ =
∑
β∈A xβvβ(x). Substituting in (3.4), we obtain
x˙α = xα
[
vα(x)−
∑
β∈A xβvβ(x)
]
. (3.10)
The system (3.10) defines the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978)
(cf. Example 2.4). Although the derivation above assumed that x is interior, the
expression (3.10) actually describes the replicator dynamics on all of X ; we explain
why this is so in Section 3.4.
3.2. Costs of motion and Riemannian metrics. We now proceed with a reinterpre-
tation of the costs of motion using notions from geometry. The fundamental notion
here is that of a Riemannian metric, a position-dependent variant of the ordinary
(Euclidean) scalar product between vectors.11
To start, we recall that a scalar product on a subspace W of RA is a bilinear
pairing 〈·, ·〉 : W ×W → R which satisfies the following for all w,w′ ∈W :
(1) Symmetry: 〈w,w′〉 = 〈w′, w〉.
(2) Positive definiteness: 〈w,w〉 ≥ 0, with equality if and only if w = 0.
The norm of a vector w ∈W is then defined as
‖w‖ = 〈w,w〉1/2. (3.11)
When W = RA, the definition above becomes most transparent by writing w =∑
α wαeα and w
′ =
∑
β w
′
βeβ in the standard basis {eα}α∈A of RA. Since 〈·, ·〉 is
positive definite and bilinear, there exists a positive-definite matrix g = (gαβ)α,β∈A
such that
〈w,w′〉 =
∑
α,β∈A
wαgαβw
′
β = w
>gw′ (3.12a)
and
‖w‖2 =
∑
α,β∈A
wαgαβwβ = w
>gw. (3.12b)
The matrix g is known as the metric tensor of 〈·, ·〉 and its components are gαβ =
〈eα, eβ〉. Clearly, a scalar product is represented uniquely by its metric tensor and
vice versa, so we will move freely between the two representations in what follows.
With all this in mind, a Riemannian metric on an open set U of RA is a C1-
smooth assignment of scalar products 〈·, ·〉x to each x ∈ U – or, equivalently, as a
smooth field g(x) of symmetric positive-definite matrices on U . In other words, a
11To be clear, a Riemannian metric is not a metric in the sense of measuring distances between
points in a metric space, but it induces such a distance function in a canonical way. For a
comprehensive introduction to this topic, see the masterful account of Lee (1997, 2003).
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Riemannian metric prescribes a way of measuring lengths of and angles between
displacement vectors at each x ∈ U .
The similarity in notation between the above and the definition of costs of mo-
tion is not a coincidence. Looking back at (3.4), we see that costs of motion and
Riemannian metrics are both defined by means of a C1-smooth field of symmetric
positive-definite matrices, with costs and norms being related via
C(x; z) =
1
2
z>g(x)z =
1
2
‖z‖2x. (3.13)
We summarize this connection as follows:
Observation 3.1. Specifying a cost function on K◦ is equivalent to endowing K◦ with
a Riemannian metric.
Remark 3.1. Defining costs of motion and Riemannian metrics on the positive or-
thant K◦ allows us to work in standard coordinates, and simplifies passing from
one to the other. That being said, we could equally well have taken a more par-
simonious approach by defining costs of motion C(x; z) only for states x ∈ X ◦
and feasible displacement vectors z ∈ RA0 , and similarly working with Riemannian
metrics 〈·, ·〉x on RA0 for each x ∈ X ◦. In this approach, the equivalence between
cost functions and Riemannian metrics can be derived from a standard bijection
between quadratic forms and bilinear forms (see e.g., Friedberg et al., 2002, p. 433),
but at the cost of an extra degree of abstraction.
Before proceeding, it is instructive to recast our previous examples in terms of
Riemannian metrics:
Example 3.3. The Euclidean metric is defined by choosing g(x) to be the identity
matrix:
g(x) = I = diag(1, . . . , 1) for all x ∈ K◦. (3.14)
This metric corresponds to the cost function C(z;x) = 12
∑
α z
2
α of Example 3.1, and
yields the standard expressions 〈w,w′〉x = w>w′ and ‖w‖x =
√
w>w, all independent
of x.
Example 3.4. The Shahshahani metric is defined as
g(x) = diag(1/x1, . . . , 1/xn) for all x ∈ K◦. (3.15)
This metric corresponds to the cost function C(z;x) = 12
∑
α z
2
α/xα of Example 3.2,
and yields the Shahshahani inner product 〈w,w′〉x =
∑
α wαw
′
α/xα. In contrast to
its Euclidean counterpart, the Shahshahani metric is state-dependent: For instance,
since ‖eα‖x = x−1/2α , the set of vectors at x with Shahshahani norm 1 is squeezed
toward the xα axis as xα becomes small (cf. Fig. 1(b)).
We now present two further classes of metrics to which we return in Section 4:
Example 3.5. For p ≥ 0, the p-Shahshahani metric is defined as
g(x) = diag(1/xp1, . . . , 1/x
p
n) for all x ∈ K◦. (3.16)
This definition includes the Euclidean metric (p = 0) and the standard Shahshahani
metric (p = 1) as special cases, and corresponds to the cost function
C(x; z) =
1
2
∑
α∈A
z2α
xpα
. (3.17)
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e1
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(a) Euclidean unit balls (p = 0)
e1
e2 e3
(b) Shahshahani unit balls (p = 1)
e1
e2 e3
(c) p-Shahshahani unit balls (p = 2)
e1
e2 e3
(d) Nested unit balls (A1 = {2, 3}, s = 3)
Figure 1. Unit balls on the 3-simplex under the metrics of Exam-
ples 3.3–3.6. For each base point x shown, the shaded regions comprise
all tangent vectors z based at x that satisfy ‖z‖2x ≤ 1.
Since 1
xpα
/ 1
xpβ
= (xβ/xα)
p, specifying larger values of p means raising the relative
cost of changes in the use of rare strategies. For instance, if strategy α is half as
prevalent in the population as strategy β, then changes in the use of α cost 2p times
as much as changes in the use of β.
Figs. 1(a)–1(c) illustrate the effects of increasing the value of p on costs of motion:
when xα is small, increasing p increases the cost of moving toward and away from
the xα = 0 boundary relative to the cost of moving along this boundary.
Example 3.6. Let A1, . . . ,Am be a partition of A into m groups of intrinsically sim-
ilar strategies, let [α] denote the group containing strategy α, let x[α] =
∑
β∈[α] xβ
denote the population share of all strategies that are “similar” to α in the above
partition, and let s > 0 be a parameter representing the “strength” of the similarity
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relation. The nested Shahshahani metric is then defined as
gαβ(x) =
{
δαβ
xα
+ s 1x[α] if β ∈ [α],
0 otherwise.
(3.18)
While the full expression for the cost function corresponding to the metric (3.18)
is cumbersome, the cost of motion along the basic directions eβ − eα takes a fairly
simple form, namely
C(eβ − eα;x) =

1
2
(
1
xα
+ 1xβ
)
if β ∈ [α],
1
2
(
1
xα
+ 1xβ
)
+ 12s
(
1
x[α]
+ 1x[β]
)
otherwise.
(3.19)
Under (3.19), switches between strategies in the same group take the same form
as under the Shahshahani cost function from Examples 3.2 and 3.4. On the other
hand, switches between strategies in different groups are more costly, with the
additional costs being inversely proportional to population shares of the groups
and proportional to the strength of the similarity relation.
Fig. 1(d) illustrates the costs of motion (3.19) from various states in X for par-
tition A1 = {1}, A2 = {2, 3} and similarity strength s = 3. The unit balls near the
x1 = 0 boundary are elongated along that boundary to a greater extent than the
balls near the other boundaries. This reflects the fact that, mutatis mutandis, a
unit of cost buys more motion between strategies 2 and 3 than between the other
pairs of strategies.
3.3. Derivation of the dynamics: the interior case. With the above machinery at
hand, we can provide an explicit description of the game dynamics under study
on the interior X ◦ of X . To do so, fix a population game G ≡ G(A, v) and a
Riemannian metric g on K◦. Then, by (3.13), the associated Riemannian game
dynamics are
x˙ = arg max
z∈RA0
[Gv(z;x)− C(z;x)] = arg max
z∈RA0
[∑
α∈A
vα(x)zα − 12‖z‖2x
]
. (3.20)
As in Examples 3.1 and 3.2, to obtain an explicit expression for the vector of
motion that solves the maximization problem (3.20), consider the Lagrangian
Λ(z, µ;x) =
∑
α∈A
vα(x)zα − 12‖z‖2x − µ
∑
α∈A
zα. (3.21)
Then, interpreting (vα(x))α∈A as a row vector (see Section 3.6) and writing 1 =
(1, . . . , 1)> for the column vector of ones in the standard basis of RA, a simple
differentiation yields the first-order optimality condition
v(x) = z>g(x) + µ1>. (3.22)
Thus, after rearranging, we get
z = g−1(x)[v(x)>− µ1], (3.23)
where g−1(x) denotes the inverse of the matrix g(x). Using the constraint
∑
α zα =
0 to solve for µ and substituting in (3.20), some easy algebra leads to the explicit
expression
x˙ = g−1(x)
[
v(x)>− v(x)g
−1(x)1
1>g−1(x)1
1
]
. (3.24)
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Thus, if we set
v](x) = g−1(x)v(x)> and n(x) = g−1(x)1, (3.25)
we obtain
x˙ = v](x)− 〈v
](x), n(x)〉x
‖n(x)‖2x
n(x) = v](x)−
∑
α∈A v
]
α(x)∑
α∈A nα(x)
n(x) (3.26)
We now revisit our two archetypal examples in the light of the explicit expression
(3.26):
Example 3.7. If g(x) = I is the Euclidean metric, we get v](x) = v(x)> and n(x) =
1, so (3.26) immediately boils down to (3.7). Therefore, when the cost of motion
is defined using Euclidean lengths, the components of the displacement vector x˙
equal those of v(x) up to a constant that ensures that x˙ ∈ RA0 .
Example 3.8. If g(x) = diag(1/x1, . . . , 1/xn) is the Shahshahani metric of Exam-
ple 3.4, we readily get v]α(x) = xαvα(x) and nα(x) = xα, so (3.26) boils down to the
replicator dynamics (3.10). Thus, when costs are defined using the Shahshahani
norm of the population displacement vector, changes in the use of rare strategies
are more costly than changes in the use of common ones. As a consequence, the
initial term of x˙α is proportional to both the payoff vα(x) of strategy α and to the
mass xα of agents playing strategy α. The second term ensures that x˙ ∈ RA0 , but
here the normalization for strategy α is itself proportional to xα.
Remark 3.2. The derivation above is closely related to Kimura’s (1958) derivation
of the replicator dynamics in common interest games, i.e., games in which v(x) =
(Ax)> for some symmetric matrix A. Such games admit the potential function
f(x) = 12x
>Ax (cf. Eq. (2.1)), which reports one-half of the population’s average
payoff. Using somewhat different language, Kimura (1958) proposed the population
dynamics
x˙ = arg max
{∑
α
∂f
∂xα
zα : z ∈ TCX (x) and ‖z‖2x = σ2v(x)
}
. (3.27)
Here
∑
α
∂f
∂xα
zα is the rate of change of potential along z, ‖·‖2x is the Shahshahani
norm and σ2v(x) =
∑
α xα[vα(x)−
∑
β xβvβ(x)]
2 denotes the variance in the popula-
tion’s payoffs at state x. It is easy to verify that (3.27) boils down to the replicator
dynamics for the potential game v(x) = (Ax)>.
3.4. The boundary case. We now turn to an important dichotomy that arises when
extending the definition of the dynamics (3.20) to the boundary of X . To begin,
recall from (2.4) that the tangent space TK(x) to the nonnegative orthant K at x
is the linear subspace
TK(x) = {z ∈ RA : zα = 0 whenever xα = 0} = Rsupp(x). (3.28)
We then say that a Riemannian metric g on K◦ is extendable to K if the map
x 7→ g−1(x) on K◦ admits a (necessarily unique) C1-smooth extension to K which
we denote by g] (so g](x) ≡ g−1(x) for all x ∈ K◦), and which satisfies
TK(x) ⊆ im g](x) for all x ∈ K. (3.29)
In the above, im g](x) is the image (column space) of g](x); we henceforth call this
set the domain of g at x and denote it by dom g(x). Proposition B.1 in Appendix B
shows that if g is extendable in the sense of (3.29), then the field of scalar products
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associated with g also admits a unique continuous extension from K◦ to K, with
〈·, ·〉x defined on dom g(x).
In what follows, we focus on two basic forms of extendability. First, if dom g(x) =
RA for all x ∈ K, we say that g is full-rank extendable; instead, if dom g(x) = TK(x)
for all x ∈ K, we say that g is minimal-rank extendable. We henceforth use the
term “extendable” to refer to these two cases exclusively.
Example 3.9. The Euclidean metric has g](x) = g−1(x) = I for all x ∈ K, so it is
full-rank extendable by default.
Example 3.10. The Shahshahani metric has g](x) = g−1(x) = diag(x1, . . . , xn),
so dom g(x) = TK(x) = Rsupp(x) for all x ∈ K. Thus, the Shahshahani metric is
minimal-rank extendable, and the induced scalar product on dom g(x) = Rsupp(x)
is
〈w,w′〉x =
∑
α∈supp(x) wαw
′
α/xα for all w,w
′ ∈ TK(x). (3.30)
Remark 3.3. Intuitively, minimal-rank extendable metrics partition K into the rel-
ative interiors of each of its faces (including K◦ itself). We will see that under the
dynamics generated by such metrics, the relative interior of each face of X is an
invariant set.
To extend the definition of the dynamics to the boundary bd(X ) of X , we intro-
duce the cone of g-admissible vectors
Admg(x) = TCX (x) ∩ dom g(x), (3.31)
This cone, which comprises all tangent vectors z ∈ TCX (x) that also lie in dom g(x),
specifies the possible directions of motion at a given state x ∈ X . In particular,
when x ∈ X ◦ is interior, we have TCX (x) = TX (x) = RA0 and dom g(x) = RA.
Thus, the g-admissible set is the hyperplane
Admg(x) = RA0 ∩ RA = RA0 , (3.32)
as anticipated in Eq. (3.20). Further instances of g-admissible cones are depicted
in Section 3.4.
The restriction to dom g(x) is needed because the norm ‖z‖2x is only defined for
z ∈ dom g(x). When g is extendable, the only case in which dom g(x) is not all
of RA occurs when x ∈ bd(X ) and g is minimal-rank extendable, in which case
dom g(x) = TX (x) = Rsupp(x) (cf. Example 3.10).
3.5. Riemannian game dynamics. With all this at hand, we are finally in a position
to extend the definition of the dynamics to all of X . Concretely, building on (3.20),
the Riemannian game dynamics induced by an extendable g are
x˙ = arg max
z∈Admg(x)
[Gv(z;x)− C(z;x)] = arg max
z∈Admg(x)
[∑
α∈A
vα(x)zα − 12‖z‖2x
]
(RmD)
Equation (3.26) showed that (RmD) can be expressed at interior states as
x˙ = v](x)− 〈v
](x), n(x)〉x
‖n(x)‖2x
n(x) = v](x)−
∑
α∈A v
]
α(x)∑
α∈A nα(x)
n(x) (3.33a)
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(b) Minimal-rank extendability..
Figure 2. Admissible sets under the Euclidean and Shahshahani metrics.
For x ∈ X ◦, we have Admg(x) = TCX (x). For x ∈ bd(X ), we still have
Admg(x) = TCX (x) in the Euclidean case, but the Shahshahani metric
can only be extended to the tangent space Admg(x) = TX (x).
where v](x) = g](x)v(x)> and n(x) = g](x)1. After a slight rearrangement, we can
also express the dynamics as a linear transformation of payoffs v(x):
x˙α =
∑
β∈A
[
g]αβ(x)−
nα(x)nβ(x)∑
γ nγ(x)
]
vβ(x). (3.33b)
Equation (A.2b) in Appendix A provides a concise third expression for the dynamics
on X ◦ in terms of a pseudoinverse matrix.
If g is minimal-rank extendable, Proposition B.2 in Appendix B shows that (3.33)
holds for all x ∈ X , provided that one uses g](x) in the definition (3.25) of v](x)
and n(x). Proposition B.2 also shows that, in this case, one need only take the
sums in the formulas (3.33) over the strategies in the support of x.
If instead g is full-rank extendable, extending (3.33) to boundary states requires
solving a convex program whose inequality constraints may be active. For this
reason, coordinate formulas for (RmD) may depend on the support of x – and,
indeed, (RmD) may fail to be continuous at the boundary of X (see Example 4.2
below). With this in mind, it will be convenient to call the dynamics generated
by minimal-rank extendable metrics continuous Riemannian dynamics, and those
generated by full-rank extendable metrics discontinuous Riemannian dynamics.
3.6. Geometric derivation of the dynamics. In (RmD), the dynamics’ vector of
motion from x is defined to maximize the difference between the gain Gv(z;x) =∑
α∈A vα(x)zα and the cost of motion C(z;x) =
1
2‖z‖2x over the set of admissible
vectors z ∈ Admg(x). We now show how these dynamics can be derived using
a purely geometric approach, generalizing Shahshahani’s (1979) derivation of the
replicator dynamics in common interest games, and Nagurney and Zhang’s (1997)
definition of the Euclidean projection dynamics. In what follows, we rely on some
basic ideas from Riemannian geometry; for a comprehensive treatment, we refer
again to Lee (1997).
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To start, we introduce ideas about duality that explain our convention of writing
payoffs using row vectors and the notations v](x) and n(x) from Section 3.3. As
in Section 3.2, let W is a subspace of RA. A linear functional ω : W → R acting
on vectors w ∈ W is called a covector, and the space W ∗ of such functionals is
called the dual space of W . We write 〈ω|w〉 for the action of a covector ω ∈ W ∗
on a vector w ∈ W ; to emphasize this pairing, the elements of W and W ∗ are
also referred to as primal and dual vectors respectively. When W = RA, we use
the standard basis of RA to write everything in matrix notation, and distinguish
vectors and covectors by writing primal vectors w ∈ RA as column vectors and dual
vectors ω ∈ (RA)∗ as row vectors. The action 〈ω|w〉 of ω on w is then given by the
matrix product ω w =
∑
α ωαwα.
After mild manipulations, the definitions of Nash equilibrium (NE), positive cor-
relation (PC), potential games (2.1) and contractive games (2.2) can be expressed
in the form
∑
α vα(x)zα, where z is a tangent vector. Put differently, the payoff
“vector” (vα(x))α∈A acts as a linear functional on displacement vectors, and so
should be regarded as a covector. This is why we represent payoffs v(x) in matrix
notation as row vectors.
Example 3.11. The defining property (2.1) of potential games can be expressed as
〈Df(x)|z〉 = 〈v(x)|z〉 for all z ∈ RA and all x ∈ X . (3.34)
On the left-hand side, Df(x) denotes the derivative of f at x, a linear functional
that acts on tangent vectors z ∈ RA to yield the directional derivative f ′(x; z).
Thus, (3.34) can be expressed as an equality between covectors, viz. v(x) = Df(x).
Returning to our derivation of game dynamics, our aim in what follows is to find
a vector field x 7→ V (x) ∈ TC(x) that agrees to the greatest possible extent with
the payoff covector field x 7→ v(x), where this “agreement” is defined in terms of
the Riemannian metric g. The derivation requires two steps: i) using a canonical
transformation to convert the covector field into a vector field; and ii) projecting
this field onto the cone of admissible vectors of motion.
For the first step, fix a Riemannian metric g on K◦ that is extendable to K as
defined in Section 3.4. The primal equivalent of a covector ω ∈ (RA)∗ at x ∈ K is
the (necessarily unique) vector ω] ∈ dom g(x) such that
〈ω|w〉 = 〈ω], w〉x for all w ∈ dom g(x). (3.35)
In matrix notation, it is easy to verify that
ω] = g](x)ω>, (3.36)
in agreement with the definition v](x) = g](x)v(x)> from (3.25).
For the second step, we transform each vector v](x) into a g-admissible vector
by projecting it onto Admg(x). Specifically, for all x ∈ X and w ∈ dom g(x), the
projection of w at x is defined as
Πx(w) = arg min
z∈Admg(x)
‖w − z‖x. (3.37)
The induced Riemannian dynamics are then defined as
x˙ = Πx(v
](x)). (3.38)
When x ∈ X ◦ is interior, we have Admg(x) = RA0 by default, so Πx(w) is
simply the orthogonal projection of w ∈ dom g(x) = RA onto RA0 with respect
RIEMANNIAN GAME DYNAMICS 17
to g. Accordingly, Πx(w) can be computed by finding a normal vector to RA0
and subtracting this vector’s contribution to w (as in the first step of the Gram-
Schmidt orthonormalization process). To carry this out, observe that
∑
α zα = 0
for all z ∈ RA0 , so the vector n(x) = g](x)1 defined in (3.25) satisfies
〈n(x), z〉x = n(x)>g(x)z = 1>g](x)g(x)z = 0 for all z ∈ RA0 . (3.39)
This shows that n(x) is a normal vector to TX (x) with respect to g(x). Thus, for
all x ∈ X ◦, we can express the right-hand side of (3.38) as
Πx(v
](x)) = v](x)− projn(x) v](x) = v](x)−
〈n(x), v](x)〉x
‖n(x)‖2x
n(x), (3.40)
in agreement with (3.26).
More generally, for any state x ∈ X we have
Πx(v
](x)) = arg min
z∈Admg(x)
‖v](x)− z‖x
= arg min
z∈Admg(x)
[
‖v](x)‖2x + ‖z‖2x − 2〈v](x), z〉x
]
= arg max
z∈Admg(x)
[
〈v](x), z〉x − 12‖z‖2x − 12‖v](x)‖2x
]
= arg max
z∈Admg(x)
[
〈v(x)|z〉 − 12‖z‖2x
]
. (3.41)
The dynamics (3.38) and (RmD) are therefore identical. We will take advantage of
this geometric representation of (RmD) freely in what follows.
Remark 3.4. In addition to building on Kimura’s and Shahshahani’s derivations of
the replicator dynamics, the dual representations of Riemannian game dynamics
have a close analogue in a class of game dynamics called target projection dynamics
(Friesz et al., 1994; Sandholm, 2005). These dynamics are defined on X as
x˙ = arg min
x′∈X
‖v(x)− x′‖22 − x, (3.42)
Using a version of (3.41), Tsakas and Voorneveld (2009) showed that (3.42) can
also be expressed as
x˙ = arg max
x′∈X
[
〈v(x)|x′〉 − 12‖x′ − x‖22
]
− x. (3.43)
4. Examples
We now present a variety of examples of Riemannian game dynamics. We start
by extending the interior expressions (3.7) and (3.10) for our two prototypical dy-
namics to allow for boundary states:
Example 4.1 (Replicator dynamics revisited). Let g be the Shahshahani metric,
so g]αβ(x) = δαβxβ , nα(x) = xα, and v
]
α(x) = xαvα(x). Since g is minimal-rank
extendable, (3.33) yields the (continuous) Riemannian dynamics
x˙α = xα
[
vα(x)−
∑
β
xβvβ(x)
]
, (RD)
which are the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). The dynamics’
continuity is reflected in the fact that the formula (RD) is valid throughout X .
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Example 4.2 (Projection dynamics revisited). Let g be the Euclidean metric. Start-
ing from formulation (3.38), Lahkar and Sandholm (2008) derived the following
representation of the associated (discontinuous) Riemannian dynamics:
x˙α =
{
vα(x)− |A(x)|−1
∑
β∈A(x) vβ(x) if α ∈ A(x),
0 otherwise,
(4.1)
where A(x) is a subset of A that maximizes the average |A′|−1∑β∈A′ vβ(x) over
all subsets A′ ⊂ A that contain supp(x). These are the projection dynamics (PD)
of Nagurney and Zhang (1997). The discontinuity of (PD) is reflected in the ap-
pearance of supp(x) in (4.1) via the definition of A(x).
Remark 4.1. The dynamics (RD) and (PD) highlight an important qualitative dif-
ference between Shahshahani and Euclidean projections, which is representative of
continuous and discontinuous Riemannian dynamics respectively. The replicator
dynamics (RD) comprise a Lipschitz continuous dynamical system on X which pre-
serves the face structure of X , in that the relative interior of each face of X remains
invariant. By contrast, the projection dynamics (PD) may fail to be continuous at
the boundary of X . Thus, the relevant notion of a solution to (PD) is that of a
Carathéodory solution, which allows for kinks at a measure zero set of times. As a
result, solutions of (PD) may leave and re-enter the relative interior of any face of
X in perpetuity.
The next example generalizes the previous two:
Example 4.3 (The p-replicator dynamics). For p ≥ 0, let gαβ(x) = δαβx−pβ denote
the p-Shahshahani metric introduced in Example 3.5. We then have g]αβ(x) =
δαβx
p
β , nα(x) = x
p
α, and v]α(x) = xpαvα(x). Thus, (3.33) yields the p-replicator
dynamics
x˙α = x
p
α
(
vα(x)−
∑
β∈A x
p
βvβ(x)∑
β∈A x
p
β
)
, (4.2)
valid for all interior x ∈ X ◦.
These dynamics were first defined by Harper (2011). Since g is minimal-rank
extendable if and only if p > 0, the dynamics are defined throughout X via Eq. (4.2)
for precisely these values of p. However, the dynamics are only Lipschitz continuous
for p ≥ 1; see Example 4.6 and Section 6.1 below. Three values of p are worth
highlighting:
(1) For p = 0, we obtain the projection dynamics (PD).
(2) For p = 1, we obtain the replicator dynamics (RD).
(3) For p = 2, we obtain the log-barrier dynamics, a system first examined by
Bayer and Lagarias (1989) in the context of convex programming.12
In the above dynamics, the value of p parametrizes the costs of changes in the use
of less common strategies. This is illustrated in Fig. 3, which presents a collection
of p-replicator phase portraits in standard Rock-Paper-Scissors:
A =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 . (4.3)
12The reason for this name is explained in Example 4.6; see especially Eq. (4.14).
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When p = 0, displacement costs are independent of the current state; thus the cir-
cular form of the payoffs (4.3) generates circular closed orbits, subject to feasibility
constraints (Fig. 3(a)). As p increases, the costs of motion for uncommon strate-
gies become more important relative to the game’s payoffs (Figs. 3(b) and 3(c)).
As a direct consequence, the closed orbits of the dynamics are “flattened” near
each face of the simplex, and are ultimately reshaped into a nearly triangular form
(Fig. 3(d)).13
Fig. 3 also illustrates a basic dichotomy between continuous and discontinuous
Riemannian dynamics. In the discontinuous regime (p = 0), there is a unique
forward solution from every initial condition in X . However, solutions may enter
and leave the boundary of X , and solutions from different initial conditions can
merge in finite time. In the smooth regime (p ≥ 1), solutions exist and are unique
in forward and backward time, and the support of the state remains fixed along
each solution trajectory. Existence and uniqueness of solutions is treated formally
in Section 6.1.
Example 4.4 (Separable metrics and their dynamics). A Riemannian metric g on
K◦ is called separable if its metric tensor is of the form
g(x) = diag(1/φ(x1), . . . , 1/φ(xn)), (4.4)
where φ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is a continuous weighting function that is strictly positive
on (0,∞). For such metrics, we readily get
g](x) = diag(φ(x1), . . . , φ(xn)), (4.5)
so g is minimal-rank extendable if limz→0+ φ(z) = 0 and full-rank extendable oth-
erwise.
When (3.33) applies, the dynamics induced by g take the form
x˙α = φ(xα)
[
vα(x)−
∑
β φ(xβ)vβ(x)∑
β φ(xβ)
]
. (4.6)
Ignoring the dynamics’ behavior at the boundary, (4.6) was studied by Harper
(2011) under the name escort replicator dynamics, and was further examined by
Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) and Bravo and Mertikopoulos (2017) in the
context of game-theoretic learning (see Section 8). It is clear that the construction
above generalizes immediately to allow different weighting functions for different
strategies.
Moving beyond the separable case, Riemannian dynamics can also capture the
effects of intrinsic relationships among the game’s strategies.
Example 4.5 (Nested replicator dynamics). In Example 3.6, we defined the nested
Shahshani metric as
gαβ(x) =
{
δαβ
xα
+ s 1x[α] if β ∈ [α],
0 otherwise,
(4.7)
where A1, . . . ,Am is a partition of A into groups of intrinsically similar strategies,
[α] denotes the group containing strategy α, x[α] =
∑
β∈[α] xβ , and s is a positive
13That all of these dynamics feature closed orbits is not coincidental – see Proposition 7.5.
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(a) p = 0 (projection)
R
P S
(b) p = 1 (replicator)
R
P S
(c) p = 3/2
R
P S
(d) p = 5
Figure 3. Phase portraits of the p-replicator dynamics in standard Rock-
Paper-Scissors. As p ∈ [0,∞) increases, the shape of the closed orbits
changes from circular to triangular. When p = 0, solutions enter and
leave the boundary of the simplex, but forward solutions exist and are
unique. For p ≥ 1, forward and backward solutions exist, are unique,
and their support is constant.
constant. A straightforward calculation shows that
g]αβ(x) =
{
xαδαβ − s1+s xαxβx[α] if β ∈ [α],
0 otherwise.
(4.8)
It is evident from (4.8) that the metric g is minimal-rank extendable. Applying
(3.33), we find that g generates the nested replicator dynamics:
x˙α = xα
 s
1 + s
vα(x)− 1
x[α]
∑
β∈[α]
xβvβ(x)
+ 1
1 + s
vα(x)−∑
β∈A
xβvβ(x)

(NRD)
if xα > 0 and x˙α = 0 otherwise.
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R
P S
(a) A1 = {R,P}, A2 = {S}
R
P S
(b) A1 = {R, S}, A2 = {P}
Figure 4. Phase portraits of the nested replicator dynamics in standard
Rock-Paper-Scissors with s = 3 for two similarity groupings.
The imitative dynamics (NRD) were introduced by Mertikopoulos and Sand-
holm (2018) to model settings in which agents assess strategies using two distinct
procedures: at rate s1+s , an agent only compares the payoff of his current strategy
α to those of strategies in group [α]; at rate 11+s , they compare the payoff of their
current strategy to that of all other strategies.
Fig. 4 presents phase diagrams of the dynamics (NRD) with s = 3 in the stan-
dard Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The two panels illustrate the consequences of two
similarity groupings. In each case, the longest “side” of each closed orbit corre-
sponds to the pair of similar strategies, which are switched between more easily
than the remaining pairs of dissimilar strategies.
The following class of dynamics incorporates all of our previous examples. It is
examined at depth in Sections 7 and 8:
Example 4.6 (Hessian Riemannian metrics and their dynamics). A generalization
of the above class of examples can be obtained by considering Riemannian metrics
that are defined as Hessians of convex functions.14 To that end, let h : K → R be a
continuous function on K such that
(i) h is C3-smooth on every positive suborthant of K.
(ii) Hessh(x) is positive definite for all x ∈ K◦.
Then, h induces a natural Riemannian metric on K◦ defined as
g = Hessh, (4.9)
or, in components:
gαβ(x) =
∂2h(x)
∂xα∂xβ
. (4.10)
When this is the case, we say that g is a Hessian Riemannian (HR) metric and we
refer to h as the metric potential of g.
14For the origins of the idea in geometry, see Duistermaat (2001) and references therein; for
applications to convex programming, see Bolte and Teboulle (2003) and Alvarez et al. (2004).
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p name regularity potential
0 projection discontinuous quadratic
(0, 1) —— not Lipschitz power law
1 replicator smooth Gibbs entropy
(1, 2) —— smooth Tsallis entropy
2 log-barrier smooth logarithmic
(2,∞) —— smooth inverse power law
Table 1. Regularity of the p-replicator dynamics and behavior of the
metric potential function hp.
As an example, the metric (3.18) that generates the nested dynamics (NRD) is
an HR metric with potential
h(x) =
∑
α∈A
xα
(
log xα + s log x[α]
)
. (4.11)
Moreover, every separable metric of the form (4.4) is an HR metric with potential
h(x) =
∑
α∈A
θ(xα) (4.12)
for some smooth function θ : [0,+∞) → R with 1/θ′′(z) = φ(z). In particular, for
p /∈ {1, 2}, the p-replicator dynamics are generated by the potential
hp(x) =
∑
α∈A
θp(xα) with θp(z) = 1(p−1)(p−2)z
2−p, (4.13)
and for p = 1 and p = 2, the corresponding potential functions are
h1(x) =
∑
α∈A
xα log xα and h2(x) = −
∑
α∈A
log xα, (4.14)
respectively.15 The values p = 0, p = 1, and p = 2 partition the class of p-replicator
dynamics into seven cases whose properties we summarize in Table 1.16
Definition (4.9) is an integrability condition on the matrix field g. As with
vector fields on simply connected domains, this can be characterized by a symmetry
condition on the derivatives of g,17 namely
∂gαγ
∂xβ
=
∂gβγ
∂xα
for all α, β, γ ∈ A. (4.15)
15It is possible to define the potential hp for all values of p using a single formula. Let θp(z) =
(z2−p + p(p− 2)z − (p− 1)2)/((p− 1)(p− 2)) when p 6= {1, 2}, and define θ1 and θ2 by analytic
continuation. Linear and constant terms do not affect the resulting metric, and the explicit
formulas for θ1 and θ2 follow from the fact that lima→0(za − 1)/a = log z.
16When p ≥ 2, the potential hp becomes infinite on the boundary of K, violating a standing
assumption for h; we address this technicality in Remark 7.1. Also, the (negative) Tsallis entropy
(Tsallis, 1988) mentioned in Table 1 is defined as Sq(x) = (q − 1)−1
∑
α(x
q
α − xα) for q ∈ (0, 1).
17This characterization follows from the integrability condition for ordinary vector fields (i.e.
symmetry of the Jacobian matrix) and the symmetry of g(x).
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Conditions (4.9) and (4.15) differ fundamentally from integrability conditions ap-
pearing in previous work on game dynamics, which are imposed on the vector fields
that define the dynamics.18 In Section 7, we show that this integrability property
provides important theoretical tools for the analysis of the induced Riemannian
dynamics, which we call Hessian game dynamics.
5. Microfoundations via revision protocols
To provide microfoundations for deterministic game dynamics (D), one typically
specifies a stochastic revision process that induces (D) in the so-called “mean field”
limit. To do so, suppose that agents in the population are recurrently chosen at
random and given the opportunity to switch strategies. What agents do when facing
such opportunities is described by a revision protocol ρ whose components ραβ(x, pi)
describe the rates at which α-strategists who have received revision opportunities
switch to strategy β, as a function of the current population state x and payoff
vector pi.19
Together, a population game G ≡ G(A, v) and a revision protocol ρ induce the
mean dynamics:
x˙α =
∑
β 6=α
[
xβρβα(x, v(x))− xαραβ(x, v(x))
]
, (MD)
which describe the rate of change in the use of each strategy α as the difference
between inflows into α from other strategies and outflows from α to other strategies.
For a fixed protocol ρ, (MD) can be viewed as a map from population games v to
laws of motion on X , as described in Section 2.2.20
The prototype for this construction is, again, the replicator dynamics (RD).
Three well-known protocols that generate (RD) are:
ραβ(x, pi) = xβpiβ , (5.1a)
ραβ(x, pi) = −xβpiα, (5.1b)
ραβ(x, pi) = xβ [piβ − piα]+ , (5.1c)
with pi assumed nonnegative in (5.1a) and nonpositive in (5.1b).21 The xβ appearing
in the right-hand sides allows us to interpret (5.1a)–(5.1c) as imitative protocols,
with a revising agent picking a candidate strategy by observing the choice and
the payoff of a randomly chosen opponent. The protocols differ in how payoffs
determine the rates at which switches are consummated. Protocols (5.1a) and
(5.1b), due to Weibull (1995) and Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996), are respectively
called imitation of success and imitation driven by dissatisfaction. In the former,
imitation rates increase linearly in the opponent’s payoff; in the latter, imitation
rates decrease linearly in the revising agent’s own payoff. Protocol (5.1c) is due
to Helbing (1992) and Schlag (1998), and is called pairwise proportional imitation.
18See Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009), and Sandholm (2010a,
2014).
19Weibull (1995) and Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996) introduce revision protocols for imitative
dynamics. Sandholm (2010b, 2015) extends this approach to more general classes of dynamics.
20Solutions to (MD) may further be viewed as approximations to the sample paths of stochastic
evolutionary models generated by the game G and protocol ρ: for a comprehensive treatment, see
Benaïm and Weibull (2003) and Roth and Sandholm (2013).
21Since the replicator dynamics (and all Riemannian game dynamics) are invariant to equal
shifts in all strategies’ payoffs, these assumptions about payoffs are innocuous.
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Under (5.1c), a revising agent only considers switching if the opponent’s payoff
is higher than their own, and then does so at a rate proportional to the payoff
difference. Substituting any of these protocols into (MD) and rearranging yields
the replicator dynamics (RD).
We now show that the revision protocols from this example can be generalized
to cover wider ranges of Riemannian game dynamics, focusing again on interior
population states:22
Proposition 5.1. Let g be an extendable Riemannian metric such that g](x) is non-
negative for all x ∈ X ◦. Then up to a change of speed, the following protocols
generate (RmD) as their mean dynamics on X ◦:
ραβ(x, pi) =
(g](x)1)α
xα
(pig](x))β , (5.2a)
ραβ(x, pi) = − (pig
](x))α
xα
(g](x)1)β , (5.2b)
where pi is assumed nonnegative in (5.2a) and nonpositive in (5.2b). In addition, if
g(x) is diagonal, the dynamics (RmD) are also generated (up to a change of speed)
by the protocol
ραβ(x, pi) =
g]αα(x)
xα
g]ββ(x)[piβ − piα]+. (5.2c)
Proof. Substitute (5.2a)–(5.2c) with pi = v(x), v](x) = (v(x)g](x))>, and n(x) =
(1g](x))> into (MD) to obtain
x˙ = v](x)
∑
β∈A
nβ(x)− n(x)
∑
β∈A
v]β(x). (5.3)
Changing the speed at state x by dividing the right-hand side of (5.3) by s(x) =∑
β nβ(x) yields form (3.33a) of (RmD). 
After a change of speed, the Riemannian dynamics (RmD) take the symmetric
form (5.3), and this symmetry is a source of the appealing properties of the dynam-
ics established below. By contrast, the random assignment of revision opportunities
implies that, under the mean dynamics (MD), the outflow rate from each strategy
α to other strategies is proportional to the popularity xα of the original strat-
egy, resulting in an expression that is not symmetric. The factor xα appearing in
the denominators in (5.2) also lets us recover the symmetric expression (5.3) from
(MD).
The asymmetric treatment of current and candidate strategies under (5.2) is
illustrated by our running examples:
Example 5.1 (p-replicator dynamics). Since p-replicator dynamics are generated
by the Riemannian metric g(x) = diag(1/xp1, . . . , 1/x
p
n), (5.2c) implies that these
dynamics are induced by the revision protocols
ραβ(x, pi) = x
p−1
α x
p
β [piβ − piα]+. (5.4)
22Under minimal-rank extendible metrics, the result to follow also applies on the boundary.
Handling boundary states under full-rank extendable metrics requires modifications of the sort
described in Lahkar and Sandholm (2008), a direction we do not pursue here.
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When p = 1, we have xp−1α = 1 and x
p
β = xβ , so (5.4) boils down to the pairwise
proportional imitation protocol (5.2c) and induces the replicator dynamics (RD).
When p = 0, we have xp−1α = x−1α and x
p
β = 1, so (5.4) gives
ραβ(x, pi) = x
−1
α [piβ − piα]+, (5.5)
and induces the projection dynamics (PD) on X ◦. Protocol (5.5) was introduced
by Lahkar and Sandholm (2008), who interpret it as a model of “revision driven by
insecurity”: agents playing rare strategies are particularly likely to consider revising,
while candidate strategies are chosen without regard for their current levels of use.
While the revision protocols (5.2) are capable of generating many Riemannian
dynamics (RmD), one can sometimes construct simpler protocols that take advan-
tage of the structure of smaller classes of Riemannian dynamics. For the micro-
foundations of the nested replicator dynamics (NRD) and extensions thereof, we
refer the reader to Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2018).
6. General properties
In this section, we derive some general results for (RmD). In Section 6.1 we
state a basic but technically challenging result on the existence and uniqueness of
solutions. In Section 6.2 we show that the dynamics exhibit positive correlation
with the game’s payoffs, and we characterize the dynamics’ rest points as either
restricted equilibria or Nash equilibria. Finally, in Section 6.3 we study the global
behavior of the dynamics in potential games.
6.1. Existence and uniqueness of solutions. To illustrate the possibilities for ex-
istence and uniqueness of solutions, it is useful to start with a simple example.
Specifically, consider the p-replicator dynamics of Example 4.3 for a 2-strategy
game with action set A = {1, 2} and payoff functions v1(x) = 1, v2(x) = 0.
When p = 1, we obtain the toy replicator equation
x˙1 = x1(1− x1). (6.1)
Solutions to this equation exist and are unique for all t ∈ (−∞,∞), and the support
of x(t) is invariant. The pure states 0 and 1 are both rest points, and it is easy to
check that the unique solution with initial condition x1(0) = a ∈ (0, 1) is x1(t) =
a/[a+ (1− a)e−t].
When p = 0, we obtain the Euclidean projection dynamics
x˙1 =
{
1/2 if x1 < 1
0 if x1 = 1.
(6.2)
For every initial condition x1(0) ∈ [0, 1], this equation admits the unique forward
solution x1(t) = x1(0) + t/2 for t ∈ [0, 2(1 − x1(0))) and x1(t) = 1 thereafter.
Evidently, the support of x(t) is not invariant; also, backward solutions are not
defined for all time, and solutions are not smooth in t when x1 = 1 is reached.
Finally, when p = 1/2, we obtain the differential equation
x˙1 =
√
x1(1− x1)√
x1 +
√
1− x1
. (6.3)
Although this equation admits forward (and backward) solutions from every ini-
tial condition, these are no longer unique. Starting at x1(0) = 0, we have the
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stationary solution x1(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0,∞); furthermore, one can verify by a di-
rect – albeit tedious – calculation that there is another solution, namely x1(t) =
1
2 +
t−2
4
√
1 + t− t2/4 for t ∈ [0, 4) and x1(t) = 1 thereafter. Additional solutions
may linger at x1 = 0 before emulating the previous solution trajectory.
The differences in behavior in the three cases above can be traced back to the
properties of the underlying Riemannian metrics. First, the replicator dynamics are
generated by the Shahshahani metric, which is minimal-rank extendable to all of
X . In this case the induced dynamics (RmD) are Lipschitz continuous, so existence
and uniqueness of solutions is guaranteed by the Picard–Lindelöf theorem (along
with an argument to account for X being closed). Moreover, the support of x(t)
is constant, and solutions exist in both forward and backward time (Sandholm,
2010b, Theorems 4.A.5 and 5.4.7).
On the other hand, the Euclidean projection dynamics (PD) are generated by
a full-rank extendable metric. In such cases, the induced dynamics (RmD) are
typically discontinuous, so the relevant solution notion is that of a Carathéodory
solution, an absolutely continuous trajectory that satisfies (RmD) for almost all
t ≥ 0. In the case of (PD), Lahkar and Sandholm (2008) showed that every
initial condition admits a unique Carathéodory forward solution; however, different
solution orbits can merge in finite time, as illustrated in the previous example and
in Fig. 3(a).
The following proposition shows that this behavior of (RD) and (PD) is repre-
sentative of the minimal-rank and full-rank extendable cases respectively:
Proposition 6.1. Let g be an extendable Riemannian metric.
(i) If g is minimal-rank extendable, (RmD) admits a unique global solution from
every initial condition in X ; moreover, each solution has constant support.
(ii) If g is full-rank extendable, (RmD) admits a unique forward Carathéodory
solution from every initial condition in X .
Proposition 6.1 justifies the terminology continuous and discontinuous that we
introduced in Section 3.5 to refer to dynamics induced by minimal-rank and full-
rank metrics. The nontrivial part of Proposition 6.1 is the proof of part (ii): despite
an apparent similarity, this result is considerably harder than the corresponding
result of Lahkar and Sandholm (2008) for (PD), so we relegate its proof to Ap-
pendix D. The main reason for this difficulty is that known uniqueness proofs for
projected differential equations depend crucially on the Riemannian metric being
constant throughout the dynamics’ state space, an assumption that obviously fails
here.
Of course, as can be seen from the continuous – but not Lipschitz continuous –
system (6.3), (RmD) may fail to admit unique solutions from initial conditions at
the boundary of X if the underlying metric does not admit a Lipschitz continuous
extension to the boundary of X . To avoid the resulting complications, we do not
consider dynamics that are continuous but not Lipschitz continuous in the rest of
the paper.
6.2. Basic properties. We now establish some basic relationships between (RmD)
and the payoffs of the underlying game. We first show that (RmD) respects positive
correlation:
Proposition 6.2. The dynamics (RmD) satisfy (PC).
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Proof. Let V (x) = Πx(v](x)). We then claim that
〈v(x)|V (x)〉 = 〈v](x), V (x)〉x ≥ 〈Πx(v](x)), V (x)〉x = ‖V (x)‖2x ≥ 0, (6.4)
with equality if and only if V (x) = 0. The only step in (6.4) needing justification is
the first inequality. For this step, we split the analysis into three cases. First, if x ∈
X ◦, the inequality binds because Πx orthogonally projects RA onto RA0 = Admg(x),
which contains V (x). Second, if x ∈ bd(X ) and g is minimal-rank extendable, then
v](x) ∈ Rsupp(x), so the inequality binds because Πx projects Rsupp(x) orthogonally
onto RA0 ∩ Rsupp(x) = Admg(x), which contains V (x). Finally, if x ∈ bd(X ) and g
is full-rank extendable, Πx is the closest point projection of RA onto the tangent
cone TCX (x). Hence, by Moreau’s decomposition theorem (Hiriart-Urruty and
Lemaréchal, 2001), we infer that v](x)−Πx(v](x)) lies in the normal cone
NCX (x) = {w ∈ RA : 〈w, z〉x ≤ 0 for all z ∈ TCX (x)}. (6.5)
Since V (x) ∈ Admg(x) = TCX (x), the first inequality in (6.4) is immediate. 
Proposition 6.2 is not particularly surprising: after all, the basic postulate behind
(RmD) is that the dynamics’ vector of motion is the closest feasible approximation
to the game’s payoff field, with the notion of closeness determined by the under-
lying Riemannian metric (or, equivalently, cost function). As we show below, this
alignment can be exploited further to characterize the dynamics’ rest points.
To that end, recall that one of the main attributes of the Euclidean projection
dynamics (PD) is Nash stationarity :
x∗ ∈ X is a rest point if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium. (NS)
This property does not hold under the replicator dynamics: for instance, every pure
state of X is stationary under (RD). In this case, (NS) is replaced by the notion of
restricted stationarity :23
x∗ ∈ X is a rest point if and only if it is a restricted equilibrium. (RS)
Our next result shows that this difference between the projection and the repli-
cator dynamics is representative of the discontinuous and continuous cases, and
highlights one advantage of the former over the latter:
Proposition 6.3.
(i) Continuous Riemannian dynamics satisfy (RS).
(ii) Discontinuous Riemannian dynamics satisfy (NS).
Proof. For (i), recall that the coordinate expression (3.33) for (RmD) always holds
when g is minimal-rank extendable, and x˙α = 0 whenever xα = 0. Therefore, it
suffices to check that x∗ ∈ X ◦ is a rest point if and only if all the components of
v(x∗) are equal. To that end, note that x∗ is a rest point of (3.33) if and only if
v](x∗) =
∑
γ v
]
γ(x
∗)∑
γ nγ(x
∗)
n(x∗) ∝ n(x∗). (6.6)
In turn, this means that x∗ is a rest point of (RmD) if and only if v](x∗) ∝ n(x∗);
our claim then follows from the fact that g](x∗) is invertible.
23Recall here that x∗ is a restricted equilibrium if all strategies in its support earn equal payoffs.
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For (ii), assume that g if full-rank extendable and fix some x∗ ∈ X . It is easy
to show that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the variational
characterization
0 ≤ 〈v(x∗)|x− x∗〉 = 〈v](x∗), x− x∗〉x∗ for all x ∈ X , (6.7)
which says that v](x∗) lies in the normal cone NCX (x∗) of X at x∗ (cf. Eq. 6.5
above). Moreau’s decomposition theorem then yields v](x∗) ∈ NCX (x∗) if and
only if Πx∗(v](x∗)) = 0, so our assertion follows. 
Remark 6.1. We note without proof that shifting all strategies’ payoffs by the same
amount has no effect on (RmD), and rescaling all strategies’ payoffs by the same
factor only changes the speed at which solution paths are traversed. In addition,
on the face of X spanned by a subset A′ of A, continuous dynamics are invariant
to changes in the payoffs of strategies outside of A′.
6.3. Global convergence in potential games. Recall here that G ≡ G(A, v) is a
potential game if vα(x) = ∂αf(x) for some potential function f : X → R (cf. Ex-
ample 2.2). It then follows from Proposition 6.2 that f is a strict global Lyapunov
function for (RmD), meaning that its value increases along (RmD) whenever the
dynamics are not at rest.24
For continuous Riemannian dynamics, a standard Lyapunov argument implies
that all ω-limit points of (RmD) are rest points – and hence, by Proposition 6.3,
restricted equilibria of G. However, this argument does not extend to discontinuous
dynamics and Nash equilibria because it requires continuity of solutions with respect
to initial conditions, a requirement which is difficult to prove in our case. To
circumvent this obstacle, we establish a lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) bound on the
rate of change of the game’s potential function. This bound then allows us to apply
Proposition C.1 in Appendix C, which shows that, for dynamics on a compact
set, such a bound on the rate of change of a Lyapunov function guarantees global
convergence.
Proposition 6.4. Let G be a potential game with potential function f . Then, f is
a strict Lyapunov function for (RmD) and every ω-limit point of (RmD) is a rest
point of (RmD). These are restricted equilibria if (RmD) is continuous, and Nash
equilibria if (RmD) is discontinuous.
Proof. Let V (x) = Πx(v](x)) and let x(t) be a solution of (RmD). Then, Proposi-
tion 6.2 yields
d
dt
f(x(t)) = 〈Df(x(t))|x˙(t)〉 = 〈v(x(t))|V (x(t))〉 ≥ 0, (6.8)
with equality if and only if V (x(t)) = 0. Hence, f is a strict global Lyapunov
function for (RmD).
When (RmD) is (Lipschitz) continuous, a standard argument shows that every
ω-limit point of (RmD) is a rest point thereof (see e.g. Sandholm, 2010b, Theorem
7.B.3). The discontinuous case however requires a different treatment. To start,
note that
d
dt
f(x(t)) = 〈v(x(t))|V (x(t))〉 = 〈v](x),Πx(v](x))〉x ≥ ‖V (x(t))‖2x ≥ 0, (6.9)
24Definitions concerning stability and convergence are collected in Appendix C.
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where the first inequality follows from Moreau’s decomposition theorem. Both
inequalities bind if and only if V (x(t)) = 0; since the speed function x 7→ ‖V (x)‖x
is lower semi-continuous (cf. Lemma C.2), Proposition C.1 shows that every ω-limit
point of (RmD) is a rest point. 
The classic analyses of Kimura (1958) and Shahshahani (1979) showed that in
common interest games, average payoffs are increased at a maximal rate under
the replicator dynamics, provided that “maximal” is defined with respect to the
Shahshahani metric. We conclude this section by deriving an analogous principle
for all Riemannian game dynamics. To state it, define the gradient of a smooth
function f : K◦ → R with respect to g by
gradf(x) = (Df(x) g−1(x))>, (6.10)
that is, as the (necessarily unique) vector satisfying
〈Df(x)|z〉 = 〈gradf(x), z〉x for all z ∈ RA, x ∈ K◦. (6.11)
Geometrically, the vector gradf(x) represents the direction of maximal increase of
the function f at x with respect to the metric g.25 We then have:
Proposition 6.5. Let G be a potential game with potential function f and let g be an
extendable Riemannian metric. Then, for all x ∈ X ◦, the vector field that defines
(RmD) is the projection of gradf onto TX (x) with respect to g.
Proof. Since v(x) = Df(x), we have Πx(v](x)) = Πx(gradf(x)), as claimed. 
Hence, at interior states, the dynamics (RmD) increase the value of potential
at a maximal rate under the geometry defined by g, subject to feasibility. For
discontinuous dynamics, this conclusion remains true even at boundary states. For
continuous dynamics, the interior of each face of X is invariant under (RmD), so
this conclusion holds provided that feasibility is understood to incorporate this
additional constraint.
7. Hessian game dynamics
By virtue of the integrability property that defines them, potential games have
desirable convergence properties under a wide range of evolutionary dynamics. By
contrast, convergence results for other classes of games – for instance, contractive
games and games with an evolutionarily stable state (ESS) – require additional
structure, often taking the form of integrability properties built into the dynamics
themselves.26
In this section, we show that the integrability of Hessian Riemannian metrics
allows us to generalize several properties of the replicator dynamics and the Eu-
clidean projection dynamics to a substantially broader class of dynamics. These
Hessian game dynamics, introduced in Example 4.6, take the form
x˙ = arg max
z∈Admg(x)
[
〈v(x)|z〉 − 12‖z‖2x
]
, g = Hessh, (HD)
where the continuous function h : K → R is C3-smooth on every positive suborthant
of K, and where Hessh(x) is positive definite for all x ∈ K◦. As we demonstrate
25Specifically, this means that gradf(x) = argmax{Dzf(x) : ‖z‖x = 1}; that this is so follows
from the definition of gradf(x) and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
26See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007), Sandholm (2010a), and Zusai (2018).
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below, the integrability built into the dynamics (HD) is the source of a variety of
stability and convergence results.
A key element of our analysis is the so-called Bregman divergence, which we intro-
duce in Section 7.1. In Section 7.2, we establish global convergence to equilibrium
in contractive games and local stability of ESSs, while Section 7.3 demonstrates
the convergence of time-averages of interior trajectories to Nash equilibrium and
provides sufficient conditions for permanence. Finally, Section 7.4 establishes the
elimination of strictly dominated strategies under continuous Hessian dynamics.
7.1. Bregman divergences. When used as a tool for establishing convergence, Lya-
punov functions typically measure some sort of “distance” between the current state
and a target state x∗. For Hessian dynamics, a natural point of departure is the
potential function h of the metric g = Hessh that defines them. However, since the
(game-specific) target state x∗ is independent of g, there is no reason that h itself
should serve as a Lyapunov function. Instead, taking advantage of the convexity of
h, we consider the difference between h(x∗) and the best linear approximation of
h(x∗) from x.
Formally, the Bregman divergence of h (Bregman, 1967) is defined as
Dh(x
∗, x) = h(x∗)− h(x)− h′(x;x∗ − x), x∗, x ∈ X , (7.1)
where h′(x;x∗ − x) is the one-sided derivative of h at x along x∗ − x, i.e.
h′(x;x∗ − x) = lim
t→0+
t−1 [h(x+ t(x∗ − x))− h(x)] . (7.2)
Since h is convex, we have
Dh(x
∗, x) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if x∗ = x. (7.3)
On the other hand, Dh is not symmetric in x∗ and x, so it is not a bona fide distance
function on X ; rather, Dh(x∗, x) describes the remoteness of x from the base point
x∗, hence the name “divergence”.
Revisiting our two archetypal examples, the Euclidean metric is generated by
the quadratic potential h(x) = 12
∑
α x
2
α. Definition (7.1) then yields the Euclidean
divergence
DEucl(x
∗, x) =
1
2
∑
α
(xα − x∗α)2, (7.4a)
which is (uncharacteristically) symmetric in x∗ and x. Analogously, the Shahsha-
hani metric is generated by the (negative) entropy h(x) =
∑
α xα log xα. A short
calculation shows that the corresponding divergence function is the Kullback–Leib-
ler (KL) divergence
DKL(x
∗, x) =
∑
α: x∗α>0
x∗α log(x
∗
α/xα), (7.4b)
which has been used extensively in the analysis of the replicator dynamics (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995).
The key qualitative difference between the Euclidean divergence (7.4a) and the
KL divergence (7.4b) is that the former is finite for all x, x∗ ∈ X , whereas the latter
blows up to +∞ when supp(x∗) * supp(x). The reason for this blow-up is that
the entropy function h(x) =
∑
α xα log xα becomes infinitely steep as any boundary
point x of X is approached from the interior of X , i.e.
supα∈A|∂αh(xn)| → ∞ for every interior sequence xn converging to x. (7.5)
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When this is the case for all x ∈ bd(X ), we say that h is steep (Alvarez et al., 2004;
Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002). At the opposite end of the spectrum, if Dh(x)
exists for all x ∈ X , we say that h is nonsteep.
The link between the steepness of h and the finiteness of the associated Bregman
divergence is provided by the following lemma:
Lemma 7.1. Fix x∗ ∈ X and let D(x∗) denote the union of the relative interiors of
the faces of X that contain x∗, i.e.
D(x∗) ≡ {x ∈ X : supp(x∗) ⊆ supp(x)}. (7.6)
If h is steep, we have Dh(x∗, x) <∞ for all x ∈ D(x∗); by contrast, if h is nonsteep,
we have Dh(x∗, x) <∞ for all x ∈ X .
Proof. If h is steep and x ∈ D(x∗), the smoothness of h on the face of X spanned
by supp(x) ⊇ supp(x∗) implies that the directional derivative h′(x;x∗ − x) exists
and is finite, so Dh(x∗, x) is itself finite. If instead h is nonsteep, h′(x;x∗−x) exists
and is finite for all x ∈ X , so again Dh(x∗, x) <∞. 
Beyond the positive definiteness property (7.3), the attribute of the Bregman
divergence that recommends it as a Lyapunov function for (HD) is that the level
sets of Dh(x∗, ·) are perpendicular to all rays emanating from x∗ under g = Hessh.
Formally, we have:
Lemma 7.2. Let g = Hessh be an extendable HR metric and let x∗ ∈ X . Then, for
every smooth curve x(t) with constant support containing that of x∗, we have:
d
dt
Dh(x
∗, x(t)) = 〈x˙(t), x(t)− x∗〉x(t). (7.7)
In particular, if Dh(x∗, x(t)) is constant, x˙(t) is perpendicular to x(t)−x∗. Finally,
if h is nonsteep, the above conclusions hold for every smooth curve x(t) on X .
Proof. The proof is a direct application of the chain rule:
d
dt
Dh(x
∗, x) = −
∑
α
[
∂h
∂xα
x˙α +
∂h
∂xα
d
dt
(x∗α − xα) +
∑
β
∂2h
∂xα∂xβ
(x∗α − xα)x˙β
]
=
∑
α,β
(x∗α − xα)gαβ(x)x˙β = 〈x˙, x− x∗〉x, (7.8)
where all summations are taken over the (constant) support A′ ≡ supp(x(t)) of
x(t) and we used the fact that x˙α = 0 for α /∈ A′. Finally, in the nonsteep case, h
is smooth throughout X , so the above holds for every smooth curve x(t). 
Within the class of Hessian Riemannian metrics, steepness of h roughly corre-
sponds to minimal-rank extendability of the metric g = Hessh, and nonsteepness
to full-rank extendability. These analogies fail when the steepness of h does not
adequately control the regularity of g near the boundary of X , or when g is minimal-
rank extendable but generates non-Lipschitz dynamics. Bearing this in mind, we
use the term continuous Hessian dynamics for Riemannian dynamics generated
by a minimal-rank extendable metric g = Hessh with steep h, and the term dis-
continuous Hessian dynamics for Riemannian dynamics generated by a full-rank
extendable metric g = Hessh with nonsteep h. In what follows, we will tacitly
assume that the dynamics (HD) are either continuous or discontinuous.
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7.2. Contractive games and evolutionarily stable states. Recall that a population
game G ≡ G(A, v) is called contractive if 〈v(x′)− v(x)|x′ − x〉 ≤ 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X ,
strictly contractive if the inequality is strict whenever x 6= x′, and conservative if
the inequality always binds (cf. Example 2.3). As is well known, the set of Nash
equilibria of any contractive game is convex, and every strictly contractive game
admits a unique Nash equilibrium (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009).
Combining the defining inequality of strictly contractive games with the vari-
ational characterization of Nash equilibria (6.7), it follows that the (necessarily
unique) Nash equilibrium of a strictly contractive game satisfies the inequality
〈v(x)|x− x∗〉 ≤ 0 with equality only if x = x∗. (7.9)
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) call a state satisfying (7.9) a globally evolutionarily
stable state (GESS). This is the global version of the seminal local solution concept
of Maynard Smith and Price (1973): if (7.9) holds for all x 6= x∗ in a neighborhood
of x∗, then x∗ is called an evolutionarily stable state (ESS).27
It is well known that the GESS x∗ of a strictly contractive game attracts all
solutions of the replicator dynamics whose initial support contains that of x∗; by
comparison, x∗ attracts all orbits of the Euclidean projection dynamics (PD). The-
orem 7.3 extends these results to all Hessian dynamics (HD).
Theorem 7.3. Let G be the (necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium of a strictly con-
tractive game G. Then:
(i) For all continuous Hessian dynamics, Dh(x∗, ·) is a strict decreasing Lya-
punov function on D(x∗), and x∗ is asymptotically stable with basin D(x∗).
(ii) For all discontinuous Hessian dynamics, Dh(x∗, ·) is a strict decreasing global
Lyapunov function, and x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. We begin with the continuous case. By Proposition 6.1(i), every solution
x(t) of (HD) has constant support. Hence, if x(0) ∈ D(x∗), Lemma 7.2 yields:
d
dt
Dh(x
∗, x) = 〈x˙, x− x∗〉x = 〈Πx(v](x)), x− x∗〉x
= 〈v](x), x− x∗〉x = 〈v(x)|x− x∗〉, (7.10a)
≤ 0, (7.10b)
where we used the definition of Πx for minimal-rank extendable metrics (cf. Sec-
tion 3.6) to obtain (7.10a) and the definition (7.9) of a GESS for (7.10b). Since
equality in (7.10) holds if and only if x = x∗, we conclude that Dh(x∗, x) is a
strict Lyapunov function on D(x∗). If we can show in addition that x(t) has no
ω-limit points in X \D(x∗), then asymptotic stability with basin D(x∗) follows from
standard arguments (see e.g. Sandholm (2010b), Theorem 7.B.3).
Assume therefore that x(t) admits an ω-limit point xω 6= x∗, so x(tn)→ xω for
some sequence of times tn ↑ ∞. Since |x˙α(t)| is bounded from above by Vmax ≡
supx∈X maxβ |Vβ(x)| <∞, there exists an open neighborhood U of xω and positive
a, δ, n0 > 0 such that x(t) ∈ U and 〈v(x(t))|x(t)−x∗〉 ≤ −a < 0 for all t ∈ [tn, tn+δ]
and all n ≥ n0. Hence, by (7.10), we get
Dh(x
∗, x(tn + δ))−Dh(x∗, x(0)) ≤
∫ tn+δ
0
〈v(x(s))|x(s)− x∗〉 ds ≤ −a(n− n0)δ.
(7.11)
27This concise characterization of evolutionary stability is due to Hofbauer et al. (1979).
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We thus get lim inft→∞Dh(x∗, x(t)) = −∞, a contradiction.
For the discontinuous case, note first that since x∗ − x ∈ TCX (x), Moreau’s
decomposition theorem implies that 〈Πx(v](x)), x− x∗〉x ≤ 〈v](x), x− x∗〉x. Thus,
replacing the first equality in (7.10a) by an inequality, (7.10) shows that Dh(x∗, ·)
is a strict global Lyapunov function for (HD). Global asymptotic stability then
follows from Proposition C.1. 
The only implication of G being strictly contractive used in the previous proof
is that its Nash equilibrium is a GESS. More generally, if a game admits an ESS
x∗, applying the above arguments in a neighborhood of x∗ defined by a level set of
Dh(x
∗, ·) yields the following result:
Theorem 7.4. Evolutionarily stable states are asymptotically stable under (HD).
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990), Hopkins (1999), and Harper (2011) all offer re-
sults on the local stability of interior evolutionarily stable states under Riemannian
game dynamics. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) showed that under all Riemannian
(not necessarily Hessian) dynamics (RmD), the function L(x) = 〈x−x∗, x−x∗〉x∗ is
a strict local Lyapunov function for interior ESSs x∗, implying that x∗ is asymptot-
ically stable. Likewise, Hopkins (1999) used linearization to establish local stability
of regular interior ESSs (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) under (RmD). Finally, Harper
(2011) employed a version of the argument above to prove asymptotic stability of
ESSs for separable Hessian dynamics of the form (4.4).
An important case of contractive games that do not admit an ESS is the class
of conservative games, which include population games generated by matching in
symmetric zero-sum games. Under the replicator dynamics, the KL divergence
does not provide a strict Lyapunov function for conservative games, but rather a
constant of motion. The following result extends this conclusion to all Hessian
dynamics:
Proposition 7.5. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of a conservative game G. Then,
Dh(x
∗, ·) is a constant of motion along any interior solution segment of (HD).
Proof. Simply note that (7.10) binds if G is conservative and x ∈ X ◦. 
Remark 7.1. In the definition of (HD), we required that h be finite throughout
X . This requirement is unnecessary for the preceding results when x∗ is interior;
however, if x∗ lies on the boundary of X , the proofs of Theorems 7.3 and 7.4
do not go through because Dh(x∗, ·) is no longer well-defined throughout D(x∗).
Nevertheless, the results themselves remain true if g = Hessh is separable, allowing
us to handle the p-replicator dynamics for p ≥ 2 (Example 4.3). To prove this, it
suffices to replace the implicit summation in h′(x;x∗ − x) over all strategies with a
sum extending over only the strategies that lie in the support of x∗.
7.3. Convergence of time-averaged trajectories and permanence. We now extend
two classic results for the replicator dynamics in random matching games (Exam-
ple 2.1) to Hessian dynamics. The results for these games take advantage of the
linearity of payoffs vα(x) =
∑
β∈AAαβxβ in the population state.
The first such result states that if a solution x(t) of the replicator dynamics stays
a positive distance away from the boundary of the simplex, then the time-averaged
orbit x¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
x(s) ds converges to the set of Nash equilibria of the underlying
game (Schuster et al., 1981). The class of games to which this result applies includes
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zero-sum games (cf. Proposition 7.5) and games satisfying sufficient conditions for
permanence (cf. Proposition 7.7 below). The following proposition shows that this
convergence property extends to all Hessian dynamics:
Proposition 7.6. Let G be a random matching game and let x(t) be a solution orbit
of (HD). If x(t) is contained in a compact subset of X ◦, the time-averaged orbit
x¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
x(s) ds converges to the set of Nash equilibria of G.
In the case of the replicator dynamics, this is proved by introducing the auxiliary
variables yα = log xα and using the fact that y˙ = x˙/x. To extend this proof to
(HD), we instead define y via the Bregman divergence of h:
Proof of Proposition 7.6. Let yα = Dh(eα, x), so y˙α = 〈v(x)|x − eα〉 = 〈v(x)|x〉 −
vα(x) by Lemma 7.2. Then, for all α, β ∈ A, we get
yα(t)− yβ(t) = cαβ +
∫ t
0
[vβ(x(s))− vα(x(s))] ds, (7.12)
where cαβ = yα(0) − yβ(0). Since x(t) is contained in a compact subset of X ◦,
Lemma 7.1 implies that supt yα(t) <∞ for all α ∈ A. Thus, dividing both sides of
(7.12) by t and taking the limit t→∞, we obtain
lim
t→∞ [vα(x¯(t))− vβ(x¯(t))] = 0, (7.13)
where we have used the linearity of vα(x) =
∑
β Aαβxβ in x to bring the integral
into the arguments of vα and vβ .
Equation (7.13) implies that if x¯∗ is an ω-limit point of x¯(t), then vα(x¯∗) = vβ(x¯∗)
for all α, β ∈ A, so x¯∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. Since X is compact, every solution
of (HD) converges to its ω-limit set, and our assertion follows. 
Proposition 7.6 applies when the population share of each strategy remains
bounded away from zero along all interior solution trajectories, a property known as
permanence. Formally, a dynamical system on X is called permanent if there exists
a threshold δ > 0 such that every interior solution satisfies lim inft→∞ xα(t) ≥ δ for
all α ∈ A.
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) establish a sufficient condition for permanence
under the replicator dynamics. Proposition 7.7 extends this result to all continuous
Hessian dynamics, providing a sufficient condition for Proposition 7.6 to apply:
Proposition 7.7. Let G be a random matching game. Assume that the dynamics
(HD) are continuous and there exists some p ∈ X ◦ such that
〈v(x∗)|p− x∗〉 > 0 for all boundary rest points x∗ of (HD). (7.14)
Then, the dynamics (HD) are permanent.
The proof of Proposition 7.7 follows the proof technique of Theorem 13.6.1 of
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), and is presented in Appendix D.
7.4. Dominated strategies. We conclude by considering the elimination and sur-
vival of dominated strategies under (HD). To that end, recall that α ∈ A is strictly
dominated by β ∈ A if vα(x) < vβ(x) for all x ∈ X . More generally, p ∈ X is
strictly dominated by q ∈ X if 〈v(x)|p〉 < 〈v(x)|q〉 for all x ∈ X , meaning that the
average payoff of a small influx of mutants is always higher when the mutants are
distributed according to q rather than p. We then say that p ∈ X becomes extinct
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along x(t) if min{xα(t) : α ∈ supp(x∗)} → 0 as t → ∞ – or equivalently, if there
are no ω-limit points of x(t) in D(p).
Under the replicator dynamics, it is well known that dominated strategies become
extinct along every interior solution trajectory (Akin, 1980). As we show below,
this elimination result extends to all continuous Hessian dynamics (HD):
Proposition 7.8. Under all continuous Hessian dynamics (HD), strictly dominated
strategies become extinct along every interior solution orbit.
Proof. The proof follows a standard argument for the replicator dynamics, replac-
ing the KL divergence (7.4b) with the Bregman divergence (7.1). Specifically,
Lemma 7.2 implies that along any interior solution x(t),
d
dt
(Dh(p, x)−Dh(q, x)) = 〈x˙, x− p〉x − 〈x˙, x− q〉x
= 〈Πx(v](x)), q − p〉x = 〈v](x), q − p〉x = 〈v(x)|q − p〉, (7.15)
where the penultimate equality uses the fact that x ∈ X ◦. Since q strictly dominates
p and v is continuous, we have 〈v(x)|q − p〉 ≥ a for some positive constant a > 0,
implying that Dh(p, x(t)) → ∞. Hence, by Lemma 7.1, we conclude that x(t) has
no ω-limit points in D(p). 
In general, the conclusion of Proposition 7.8 is false for discontinuous Hessian
dynamics: Sandholm et al. (2008) construct a four-strategy game with a strictly
dominated strategy that is played recurrently by a nonnegligible fraction of the
population under the Euclidean projection dynamics (PD). The argument above
shows that this strategy must become less common when the state is in the interior
of X ; however, solutions to (PD) are able to enter and leave the boundary of X , and
while there, dominated strategies may become more common. We conjecture that
this construction can be suitably extended to all discontinuous Hessian dynamics,
but we do not tackle this issue here.
8. Links with reinforcement learning
Under a variety of reinforcement learning processes for normal form games, mixed
strategies evolve according to the replicator dynamics – see e.g. Börgers and Sarin
(1997), Posch (1997), Rustichini (1999), Hopkins (2002) and Hofbauer et al. (2009).
We conclude the paper by describing a broader connection between reinforcement
learning and Hessian game dynamics.
8.1. Reinforcement learning. Our starting point is a class of reinforcement learn-
ing dynamics for N -player normal form games introduced by Coucheney et al.
(2015) and Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016). Over the course of play, each
player maintains a score vector representing the cumulative payoffs of each of his
strategies; then, at each moment in time, the player selects a mixed strategy by
applying a choice map to this score vector, similar in function to the perturbed
best response maps used in stochastic fictitious play and perturbed best response
dynamics (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002, 2007).
Formally, let vkα(x) denote the expected payoff of the α-th strategy of player k
at mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) in an N -player normal form game. The
choice map Qk of player k is then defined as
Qk(yk) = arg max
xk∈Xk
{〈yk|xk〉 − hk(xk)}, (8.1)
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where Xk ≡ ∆(Ak) denotes the mixed strategy space of player k (Ak being the
corresponding strategy set), and hk : Xk → R is a smooth, strongly convex penalty
function. The reinforcement learning process described above can then be written
as
y˙k = vk(x)
xk = Qk(yk).
(RL)
Now, let gk = Hesshk and write nkα(x) =
∑
β∈Ak g
−1
k,αβ(x). Mertikopoulos and
Sandholm (2016) showed that when the mixed strategy profile x(t) is interior, its
evolution under (RL) is given by
x˙kα =
∑
β∈Ak
[
g−1k,αβ(x)−
nkα(x)nkβ(x)∑
γ nkγ(x)
]
vkβ(x). (RLD)
A comparison with (3.33b) shows that the dynamics of mixed strategies under (RL)
agree with the Hessian dynamics (HD) at interior states.28
8.2. A common derivation of (HD) and (RLD). The derivation of (HD) here and of
(RLD) in Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) have very different starting points,
leaving the reasons behind their equivalence somewhat mysterious. We now make
these reasons clearer by deriving both dynamics using a common set of tools. Here
we present the basic idea behind the argument, using the theory of convex duality
to establish the equivalence of versions of (HD) of (RLD) defined on the entire
positive orthant K◦.29 Establishing the equivalence of the original processes on X ◦
using this approach requires further ideas, which we present in Appendix A.2.
The starting point for both (HD) and (RLD) is the potential function h, assumed
here to be smooth, strongly convex, and steep at the boundary of K in the sense of
(7.5). The convex conjugate of h is then defined as30
h∗(y) = sup
x∈K◦
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)}, y ∈ (RA)∗. (8.2)
Since h is steep and strongly convex, the supremum above is attained at a unique
point QK(y) ∈ K◦ (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 26.5).31 By the first-order optimal-
ity conditions for (8.2), we then get
QK(y) ≡ arg max
x∈K◦
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)} = (Dh)−1(y), (8.3)
where (Dh)−1 is the inverse function of Dh. Applying the envelope theorem to
(8.2), we then obtain
Dh∗(y) = QK(y). (8.4)
28While we have defined Riemannian game dynamics for single population games and rein-
forcement learning for N -person normal form games, this difference is of no consequence. One
can similarly define Riemannian game dynamics for multipopulation games, or a symmetrized
reinforcement learning process for symmetric two-player normal form games (cf. Appendix A.2).
29The usefulness of convex conjugates in analyzing maps of the form (8.1) is well known in
learning and optimization – see e.g. Nemirovski and Yudin (1983), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002),
Shalev-Shwartz (2011), and Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2018).
30For a comprehensive treatment, see Rockafellar, 1970 or Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal, 2001.
31Since h is strongly convex, it is bounded below by a strictly convex quadratic function (Hiriart-
Urruty and Lemaréchal, 2001, Theorem B.4.1.1), which in turn implies that the domain of h∗ is
(Rn)∗ (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 13.1).
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It follows from (8.3) and (8.4) that Dh(Dh∗(y)) ≡ y, so differentiating and rear-
ranging yields
Hessh∗(y) = (Hessh(x))−1 (8.5)
with the inverse of the Hessian matrix of h being evaluated at x = QK(y).
We now introduce and compare full-dimensional analogues of continuous Hes-
sian dynamics and (symmetric) reinforcement learning, taking the orthant K◦ as
the state space (and so defining payoffs v on K◦). In the case of (HD), the full-
dimensional domain makes projections redundant, so the induced dynamics take
the form
x˙ = v](x) = g−1(x) v(x)>= (Hessh(x))−1 v(x)>. (HDK)
For its part, the full-dimensional analogue of (RL) is
y˙ = v(x),
x = QK(y),
(RLK)
with QK defined as in (8.3) above. Differentiating (RLK) and applying (8.4) and
(8.5) then yields
x˙ = DQK(y) v(x)>= Hessh∗(y) v(x)>= (Hessh(x))−1 v(x)>. (RLDK)
We can express this argument in words. By definition, (full-dimensional) Rie-
mannian dynamics are obtained by transforming payoffs at an interior population
state x using the matrix g−1(x). In the Hessian case, the metric g admits a potential
function h, so we have g−1(x) = (Hessh(x))−1 by definition. As for reinforcement
learning, differentiation shows that the dynamics of the mixed strategy x are ob-
tained by transforming payoffs at x by the derivative matrix DQK(y) of the choice
map (8.3). Basic facts about convex conjugacy imply that this derivative is equal to
(Hessh(x))−1, where h is the penalty function that generates QK. This argument
establishes the equivalence of (HDK) and (RLDK). For a corresponding argument
for the original processes (HD) and (RLD), see Appendix A.2.
8.3. Boundary behavior in the nonsteep regime. Since continuous Hessian dynam-
ics coincide with the reinforcement scheme (RL) when the penalty functions hk are
steep, certain results for interior trajectories – Propositions 7.6 and 7.8 in partic-
ular – can be obtained directly from the analysis of Mertikopoulos and Sandholm
(2016). On the other hand, in the nonsteep regime, (RLD) and (HD) agree at
interior states, but their behaviors at the boundary differ in a fundamental way.
Specifically, while the boundary behavior of discontinuous Hessian dynamics is de-
fined using closest point projections, the reinforcement learning process (RL) for
nonsteep h can no longer be reduced to mixed strategy dynamics at all. Instead
one must work explicitly with the score variables yk, which continue to aggregate
payoff data of all strategies, even those that are not used. Among other things, this
means that a strong cumulative performance of an unused strategy will return it
to use.
This difference between how the processes are defined on the boundary has im-
portant consequences. For instance, while Sandholm et al. (2008) show that strictly
dominated strategies may survive under the Euclidean projection dynamics, Mer-
tikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) prove that the reinforcement learning process (RL)
always eliminates dominated strategies, whether the penalty functions are steep or
not. Under both processes, dominated strategies are initially eliminated along in-
terior solution trajectories. But while they may resurface under (HD), the score
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variables of (RL) continue to register the poor performance of these strategies,
ensuring that they remain extinct for all time.
Appendix A. Connections with other game dynamics
Throughout this appendix, we write 1 ∈ Rn for the n-dimensional column vector
of ones and Φ = I − 1n11> for the Euclidean orthogonal projection of Rn onto
Rn0 = {z ∈ Rn : 1>z = 0} = span(1)⊥.32 Recall also that the (Moore-Penrose)
pseudoinverse of a matrix M ∈ Rn×n is the unique matrix M+ ∈ Rn×n such that
(i) M+y = 0 whenever y ∈ range(M)⊥; and (ii) M+y = x whenever x ∈ ker(M)⊥,
y ∈ range(M), and Mx = y (Friedberg et al., 2002, Sec. 6.7). Since a symmetric
matrixM ∈ Rn×n satisfies range(M) = ker(M)⊥, we have the following well-known
algebraic characterization of pseudoinverses:
Lemma A.1. LetM ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric matrix. Then,M+ is the unique matrix
that (i) inverts M on ker(M)⊥ = range(M); and (ii) satisfies ker(M+) = ker(M).
A.1. Interior equivalence of Riemannian dynamics and Hopkins’ dynamics. We
now derive the equivalence between (RmD) and Hopkins’ dynamics (2.7) on X ◦, as
noted in Section 2.3. To begin with, we say that M ∈ Rn×n is a Hopkins matrix
if it is positive definite with respect to Rn0 and maps 1 to 0. The following lemma
establishes a basic characterization of Hopkins matrices:
Lemma A.2.
(i) If S ∈ Rn×n is symmetric positive-definite, then (ΦSΦ)+ is a Hopkins matrix
and
(ΦSΦ)+ = S−1 − S
−111>S−1
1>S−11
. (A.1)
(ii) Conversely, ifM is a Hopkins matrix, thenM = (ΦSΦ)+, where S = M+11>
is symmetric positive definite.
Proof. To prove part (i), let S be symmetric positive-definite. Then the sym-
metric matrix ΦSΦ is positive definite with respect to Rn0 and maps 1 to 0, so
range(ΦSΦ) = ker(ΦSΦ)⊥ = Rn0 . If we denote the right-hand side of (A.1) by S¯,
a straightforward calculation shows that S¯ΦSΦz = z for all z ∈ Rn0 and S¯1 = 0.
Thus Lemma A.1 implies that S¯ = (ΦSΦ)+. That this is a Hopkins matrix is
immediate from the fact that range(ΦSΦ) = ker(ΦSΦ)⊥ = Rn0 and Lemma A.1.
To prove part (ii), let M be a Hopkins matrix and let S = M + 11>. Clearly S
is symmetric positive-definite. Moreover, writing out (ΦSΦ)+ using the right-hand
side of (A.1) and simplifying the result yields (ΦSΦ)+ = M . 
Proposition A.3 below establishes the equivalence between (2.7) and (RmD) on
X ◦, and provides a concise third representation for both dynamics. Observe that
(A.2c) is expression (3.33b) for (RmD) on X ◦, but written in matrix form.
Proposition A.3. Let x˙ = V (x) be a dynamical system on X ◦. Then, the following
are equivalent:
32In the above and what follows, W⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement of a subspace W
of Rn, defined with respect to the ordinary Euclidean metric. Even though this might seem to
suggest that the Euclidean metric plays a special role in what follows, it is just an artifact of
writing everything in coordinates instead of abstractly; for a detailed discussion, see Lee (1997).
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(i) There is a smooth field of Hopkins matrices M : X ◦ → RA×A such that
V (x) = M(x) v(x)> for all x ∈ X ◦. (A.2a)
(ii) There is a smooth field of symmetric positive-definite matrices H : X ◦ →
RA×A such that
V (x) = (ΦH(x)Φ)+v(x)> for all x ∈ X ◦. (A.2b)
(iii) There is a smooth Riemannian metric g on K◦ such that
V (x) =
(
g−1(x)− g
−1(x)11>g−1(x)
1>g−1(x)1
)
v(x)> for all x ∈ X ◦. (A.2c)
Proof. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) follows from Lemma A.2, and the equivalence
of (ii) and (iii) follows from Lemma A.2(i) with S = H(x) = g(x).33 
A.2. Continuous Hessian dynamics and reinforcement learning. We now complete
the common derivation of (HD) and (RLD) on X ◦ initiated in Section 8.2. Proposi-
tion A.3 above shows that the continuous Hessian dynamics (HD) can be expressed
as
x˙ = (ΦH(x)Φ)+v(x)>. (A.3)
We now extend the argument from Section 8.2 to show that the reinforcement
learning dynamics (RLD) also take this form.
To that end, let Z = {x− 1n1 : x ∈ X ◦} ⊂ Rn0 , and define hZ : Z → R as
hZ(z) = h(z + 1n1). (A.4)
Since Z◦ is open relative to Rn0 , the derivative DhZ of hZ at z ∈ Z◦ can be
represented by a covector DhZ(z) in (Rn0 )∗. Imposing the Euclidean metric on Rn0
for convenience, we can identify (Rn0 )∗ with the set of covectors whose components
sum to zero, and write the derivative and Hessian of hZ at z ∈ Z◦ as
DhZ(z) = Dh(z + 1n1)Φ, (A.5)
HesshZ(z) = ΦH(z + 1n1)Φ. (A.6)
The convex conjugate h∗Z of hZ is then defined as
h∗Z(y0) = max
x∈Z
{〈y|z〉 − hZ(z)}, y0 ∈ (Rn0 )∗, (A.7)
where the fact that the domain of h∗Z is all of (Rn0 )∗ follows from the compactness of
Z. By the basics of convex conjugation (Rockafellar, 1970, Chapter 26), the maps
Dh∗Z : (Rn0 )∗ → Z and DhZ : Z → (Rn0 )∗ are inverse to one another, so we have
Hessh∗Z(y0) = (HesshZ(dh
∗
Z(y0)))
−1, (A.8)
with both sides of the equality in (A.8) understood as linear maps from Rn0 to itself.
Now recall that the (symmetric) reinforcement learning process is defined by
y˙ = v(x)
x = Q(y).
(RL)
33To formally complete the argument that (ii) implies (iii), we observe without proof that the
field S on X ◦ can be smoothly extended to K◦.
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The choice map Q, defined in (8.1) in terms of h, satisfies Q(y) = Q(yΦ) for all
y ∈ Rn. Thus, applying definition (A.4), we can express Q in terms of hZ as
Q(y) = arg max
x∈X
{yΦx− h(x)} = arg max
z∈Z
{yΦz − hZ(z)}+ 1n1 = Dh∗Z(yΦ) + 1n1.
(A.9)
Hence, substituting (A.9) into (RL), differentiating, and using Eqs. (RL), (A.6),
(A.8) and (A.9) yields
x˙ = Hessh∗Z(v(x)Φ) Φv(x)
>= (HesshZ(Dh∗Z(v(x)Φ)))
−1 Φv(x)>
= (HesshZ(x− 1n1))−1 Φv(x)>= (ΦH(x)Φ)+v(x)>, (A.10)
as specified in (A.3).
Appendix B. Extensions of Riemannian metrics
Here we present some technical results concerning the extension of Riemannian
metrics from K◦ to K. Proposition B.1 shows that an extendable metric g on K
induces a well-defined scalar product at all points of K:
Proposition B.1. Let g be an extendable Riemannian metric on K. Then, for all
x ∈ K, there exists a unique scalar product 〈·, ·〉x on dom g(x) such that 〈w,w′〉xk →〈w,w′〉x for all w,w′ ∈ dom g(x) and for every interior sequence xk → x. Moreover,
if g is minimal-rank extendable, we have g]αβ(x) = 0 whenever α, β /∈ supp(x).
Proof. Fix some x ∈ K and write g](x) = Q>ΛQ where the diagonal matrix Λ con-
sists of the eigenvalues of g](x) and Q is an orthogonal matrix (Q> = Q−1) whose
columns are the eigenvectors of g](x). Since g](x) is positive-semidefinite, its eigen-
values are nonnegative. Furthermore, since dom g(x) = im g](x), every eigenvector
of a nonzero eigenvalue of g](x) must lie in dom g(x): indeed, if g](x)z = λz for
some λ > 0, we will also have z = g](x)zλ−1, i.e. z ∈ im g](x) = dom g(x). As a
result, we may write g](x) =
∑
λ>0 λuλu
>
λ where the summation is taken over all
positive eigenvalues λ > 0 of g](x) (assumed for convenience to be distinct) and uλ
is the corresponding column of Q. The metric tensor of the induced scalar product
〈·, ·〉x at x is then defined as the pseudoinverse (g](x))+ of g(x) (see Appendix A),
given here by
(g](x))+ =
∑
λ>0
λ−1uλu>λ . (B.1)
Our continuity and uniqueness claims are then immediate.
Finally, to show that g]αβ(x) = 0 if α /∈ supp(x) and g is minimal-rank extend-
able, simply note that g]αβ(x) = e
>
α g
](x)eβ =
∑
λ λ e
>
αuλu
>
λ eβ = 0 because all
eigenvectors of g](x) with positive eigenvalues lie in Rsupp(x) = dom g(x). 
Remark B.1. In the minimal-rank case, the scalar product 〈·, ·〉x on dom g(x) can
be represented by the matrix g(x) = (g](x))+. This means that the submatrix
(gαβ(x))α,β∈supp(x) is the inverse of the submatrix (g
]
αβ(x))α,β∈supp(x) while the
remaining components (which have no geometric significance) are set to 0.
Next we establish the correctness of the formulas (3.33) for dynamics generated
by a minimal-rank extendable metrics.
Proposition B.2. The formulas (3.33) describe (RmD) generated by a minimal-rank
extendable metric g at all states x ∈ X ; moreover, the sums in (3.33) need only be
taken over β ∈ supp(x).
RIEMANNIAN GAME DYNAMICS 41
Proof. The case x ∈ X ◦ is covered in the text. Otherwise, if x ∈ bd(X ), the
corresponding g-admissible set is
Admg(x) = TCX (x) ∩ TK(x) = RA0 ∩ Rsupp(x) = TX (x). (B.2)
By definition, v](x) and n(x) lie in im g](x) = Rsupp(x). Moreover, n(x) is normal
to TX (x) = RA0 ∩ Rsupp(x) because
〈n(x), z〉x = 1g](x)g(x)z = 〈1|z〉 = 0 for all z ∈ RA0 , (B.3)
where the second equality follows from Remark B.1.
Eq. (3.41) shows that the right-hand side of (RmD) is equal to Πx(v](x)). In
light of the facts above, (3.40) shows that Πx(v](x)) is equal to the right-hand side
of (3.33a), the novelty being that v]α(x) and nα(x) vanish whenever α /∈ supp(x).
These claims prove the first statement in the proposition. To establish the second
statement, simply observe that g]αβ(x) = 0 whenever α or β is not in supp(x) by
Proposition B.1, so including β /∈ supp(x) in the sums in (3.33) is irrelevant. 
Appendix C. Convergence and stability in dynamical systems
C.1. Definitions. Throughout this appendix, we focus on the dynamics
x˙ = V (x), x ∈ X , (D)
and we assume that they admit unique solutions from every initial condition. With
this in mind, we say that x∗ is an ω-limit point of the solution orbit x(t) if there is an
increasing sequence of times tn ↑ ∞ such that x(tn)→ x∗. We further say that x∗
is Lyapunov stable if, for every neighborhood U of x∗, there exists a neighborhood
U ′ of x∗ such that every solution orbit x(t) that starts in U ′ is contained in U for all
t ≥ 0. Finally, we say that x∗ is attracting if there is a neighborhood U of x∗ such
that every solution that starts in U converges to x∗, and x∗ is called asymptotically
stable if it is Lyapunov stable and attracting. In this case, the maximal (relatively)
open set of states from which solutions converge to x∗ is called the basin of x∗; if
the basin of x∗ is all of X , we say that x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
C.2. A global convergence result. A standard result from dynamical systems states
that if a smooth dynamical system on a compact set admits a strict global Lyapunov
function, all ω-limit points are rest points (see e.g. Sandholm, 2010b, Theorem
7.B.3). The proof of this result relies on the continuity of solutions on initial
conditions, a property which is not easily established for discontinuous dynamics.
In Proposition C.1 below, we present a global convergence result that does not
require continuity of solutions in initial conditions, but instead relies on a l.s.c.
lower bound on the derivative of the Lyapunov function. To state it, let
RP = {x ∈ X : V (x) = 0} (C.1)
denote the set of rest points of the dynamics (D). We then have:
Proposition C.1. Let x(t) be an absolutely continuous solution orbit of (D) and let
Γ+ = x(R+) denote the set of points visited by x(t). Assume further that RP is
closed and there exist functions L : X → R and φ : X → R+ such that
(i) L is differentiable in a neighborhood of Γ+.
(ii) φ is lower semi-continuous and φ(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ RP.
(iii) 〈DL(x)|V (x)〉 ≥ φ(x) for all x ∈ Γ+.
Then, x(t) converges to RP.
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Proof. By absolute continuity and Conditions (i) and (iii) above, we get
L(x(t))− L(x(0)) =
∫ t
0
〈DL(x(s))|V (x(s))〉 ds ≥
∫ t
0
φ(x(s)) ds ≥ 0, (C.2)
i.e. L is nondecreasing along x(t). Furthermore, since X is compact, x(t) admits at
least one ω-limit point x∗ ∈ cl(Γ+) ⊆ X . Assume now that x(t) admits an ω-limit
point xω such that V (xω) 6= 0. Since RP is closed, Condition (ii) implies that there
is a compact neighborhood K of xω and some a > 0 such that φ(x) ≥ a > 0 for all
x ∈ K. With this in mind, we consider two complementary cases below:
Case 1 . Suppose there exists some T ≥ 0 such that x(t) ∈ K for all t ≥ T . Then
φ(x(t)) ≥ a for all t ≥ T , so (C.2) yields limt→∞ L(x(t)) =∞, a contradiction.
Case 2 . Assume instead that, for all T ≥ 0, we have x(t) /∈ K for some t ≥ T . In
this case, there exist open neighborhoods U and U ′ of xω with cl(U) ⊆ U ′ ⊂ K, and
interlaced sequences tn, t′n ↑ ∞ such that, for all n: (i) tn < t′n < tn+1; (ii) x(tn) ∈
U , x(t′n) ∈ K \ U ′; and (iii) x(t) ∈ K whenever t ∈ [tn, t′n]. Then, since |x˙α(t)|
is bounded from above by Vmax ≡ supx∈X maxβ |Vβ(x)| < ∞, the time intervals
δn ≡ t′n − tn will be bounded from below by δmin ≡ dist(cl(U),K \ U ′)/Vmax > 0.
We thus get
L(x(t′n))− L(x(0)) ≥
∫ t′n
0
φ(x(s)) ds ≥
n∑
j=1
∫ t′j
tj
φ(x(s)) ds ≥ anδmin, (C.3)
i.e. L(x(t′n))→∞, a contradiction. 
To apply Proposition C.1 to discontinuous Riemannian dynamics in potential
games, we need the following result:
Lemma C.2. The speed of motion ‖V (x)‖x of the dynamics (RmD) is l.s.c. on X .
Proof. If the dynamics (RmD) are continuous, our claim follows immediately from
the continuity of the underlying metric – in fact, ‖V (x)‖x is continuous in this
case. Otherwise, if (RmD) is discontinuous, recall that V (x) ≡ Πx(v](x)) is
simply the projection of v](x) on the tangent cone TCX (x) to X at x (because
Admg(x) = TCX (x) in that case). Therefore, if we write V ⊥(x) = v](x)−V (x) for
the projection of v](x) on the normal cone NCX (x) to X at x, Moreau’s decompo-
sition theorem and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yield
〈v](x), z〉x = 〈V (x) + V ⊥(x), z〉x = 〈V (x), z〉x ≤ ‖V (x)‖x‖z‖x, (C.4)
for all z ∈ TCX (x), with the inequality binding if and only if z ∝ V (x). We thus
obtain the characterization
‖V (x)‖x = max
z∈TCX (x)∩B(x)
〈v](x), z〉x, (C.5)
where B(x) = {z ∈ RA : ‖z‖x ≤ 1}.
Note now that the correspondence x 7→ TCX (x) is l.s.c. because it is constant on
the interior of each face of X and TCX (x) ⊆ TCX (y) whenever supp(x) ⊆ supp(y).
This shows that the constraint correspondence x 7→ TCX (x)∩B(x) of (C.5) is l.s.c.;
since the objective function 〈v](x), z〉x of (C.5) is jointly continuous in x and z, a
precursor to the maximum theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Lemma 16.30)
implies that x 7→ ‖V (x)‖x is itself l.s.c., as claimed. 
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Appendix D. Additional proofs
In this appendix, we collect some proofs that are too technical for the main
text. We begin with the proof of Proposition 6.1 regarding the existence and
uniqueness of solutions to (RmD). As noted in Section 6, we only need to prove part
(ii), which concerns the case of full-rank extendable metrics. Existence of forward
solutions of (RmD) on X follows from general results of Aubin and Cellina (1984) on
solutions to discontinuous differential equations; see Lahkar and Sandholm (2008)
for a summary of their argument. Thus, it remains to show that forward solutions
to (RmD) from each initial condition in X are unique. This conclusion follows from
the following lemma:
Lemma D.1. Let x(t) and x′(t) be solutions to (RmD), and let
P (t) = ‖x′(t)− x(t)‖2x(t) e−λt. (D.1)
If λ > 0 is large enough, then P (t) is nonincreasing.
Given this lemma, we immediately obtain:
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Let x(t) and x′(t) be solutions of (RmD) with x(0) =
x′(0). We then get P (t) = P (0) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, so x(t) = x′(t) for all t ≥ 0. 
To prove Lemma D.1, we need one final auxiliary result. Let V (x) = Πx(v](x))
denote the right-hand side of (RmD). Then, as we show below, V satisfies a one-
sided Lipschitz condition with respect to the underlying metric:
Lemma D.2. There exists some KV > 0 such that
〈V (x′)− V (x), x′ − x〉x ≤ KV ‖x′ − x‖2x for all x, x′ ∈ X . (D.2)
Proof of Lemma D.2. Write w(x) = v](x) and w⊥(x) = w(x)− Πx(w(x)). Since g
is full-rank extendable, Πx is the orthogonal projection onto TCX (x) with respect
to 〈·, ·〉x. We thus obtain
〈V (x′)− V (x), x′ − x〉x = 〈w(x′)− w(x), x′ − x〉x − 〈w⊥(x′)− w⊥(x), x′ − x〉x
= 〈w(x′)− w(x), x′ − x〉x + 〈w⊥(x), x′ − x〉x
+ 〈w⊥(x′), x− x′〉x′ + (w⊥(x′))>(g(x′)− g(x))(x′ − x)
≤ Kw‖x′ − x‖2x + (w⊥(x′))>(g(x′)− g(x))(x′ − x), (D.3)
where the bound for the first term in the last line follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality and the Lipschitz continuity of w, while the rest follows from Moreau’s
decomposition theorem. To bound the last term, write gα(x) for the α-th row
of g(x), let W⊥max = maxα∈Amaxx∈X w⊥α (x), and let ‖·‖2 denote the standard
Euclidean norm. Then, if C > 0 is chosen sufficiently large, we get
(w⊥(x′))>(g(x′)− g(x))(x′ − x)
≤
∑
α∈A w
⊥
α (x
′)‖gα(x′)− gα(x)‖2‖x′ − x‖2
≤W⊥max‖x′ − x‖2
∑
α∈A‖gα(x
′)− gα(x)‖2 ≤W⊥maxC‖x′ − x‖2x. (D.4)
In the above, the first inequality is an immediate corollary of the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality; the last one follows from the equivalence of norms on RA and the fact
that g is C1 on X ; finally, C can be chosen independently of x and x′ because X is
compact. Combining (D.3) and (D.4) completes our proof. 
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With Lemma D.2 at hand, we finally obtain:
Proof of Lemma D.1. Define g˙(x) = (g˙αβ(x))α,β∈A by g˙αβ(x) = 〈Dgαβ(x)|V (x)〉 =∑
κ∈A Vκ(x) ∂κgαβ(x), and let Kg = maxα,β∈Amaxx∈X g˙αβ(x) < ∞ (recall that g
is C1). Then, for all t ≥ 0 such that x(t) and x′(t) are differentiable, we have
P˙ = 2〈V (x′)− V (x), x′ − x〉x e−λt + (x′ − x)>g˙(x)(x′ − x) e−λt − λ‖x′ − x‖2x e−λt
≤ −(λ− 2KV −Kg) ‖x′ − x‖2x e−λt, (D.5)
where we used Lemma D.2 to bound the second term in the first line. Taking
λ > 2KV + Kg then yields P˙ ≤ 0; since x(t) and x′(t) are absolutely continuous,
we conclude that P (t) is nondecreasing. 
We close this appendix with the proof of our permanence criterion:
Proof of Proposition 7.7. Define P : K → R as P (x) = − exp (∑α pαDh(eα, x))
for x ∈ K◦ and P (x) = 0 for x ∈ bd(K). The steepness of h implies that P is
continuous, while Lemma 7.2 implies that ddt log(P (x)) = Ψ(x) ≡ 〈v(x)|p − x〉 for
all x ∈ X ◦. Hence, by Theorem 12.2.1 of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), it suffices
to show that the function Ψ is an average Lyapunov function for (HD), meaning
that, for every initial condition x(0) ∈ bd(X ), there is a t > 0 such that
1
t
∫ t
0
Ψ(x(s)) ds > 0. (D.6)
We proceed by induction on the cardinality of the support of the initial condition.
The claim is trivial if this cardinality is 1. For the inductive step, suppose that (D.6)
holds when the cardinality is k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|− 2}, and consider an initial condition
x(0) whose support A′ has cardinality k+1. If x(t) converges to the boundary of the
face X ′ of X spanned by A′, then our claim follows from the inductive hypothesis
and the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 12.2.2 in Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1998). If instead x(t) does not converge to the boundary of X ′, then there exists
a δ > 0 and an increasing sequence of times tn ↑ ∞ with xα(tn) ≥ δ > 0 for all
α ∈ A′. Then, letting x¯α(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
xα(s) ds and u¯(t) = t−1
∫ t
0
〈v(x(s))|x(s)〉 ds,
we may assume (by descending to a subsequence of tn if necessary) that x¯(tn) and
u¯(tn) converge to some x¯∗ and u¯∗ respectively as n→∞.
We now claim that vα(x¯∗) = u¯∗ for all α ∈ A′, implying that x¯∗ is a restricted
equilibrium of G. Indeed, let yα(t) = Dh(eα, x(t)) for all α ∈ A′. Then, y˙α =
〈v(x)|x〉 − vα(x) by Lemma 7.2, so the linearity of v(x) in x implies that
1
t
∫ t
0
〈v(x(s))|x(s)〉 ds− vα(x¯(t)) = yα(t)− yα(0)
t
. (D.7)
Given that x(tn) remains a minimal positive distance away from bd(X ′), it follows
that yα(tn) is bounded from above for all α ∈ A′. Therefore, the right-hand side
of (D.7) vanishes as tn →∞, implying in turn that vα(x¯∗) = u¯∗ for all α ∈ A′, as
claimed.
Now, since x¯∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G, Proposition 6.3 implies that it is a
boundary rest point of (HD), so u¯∗ = 〈v(x¯∗)|x¯∗〉 < 〈v(x¯∗)|p〉 by (7.14). Moreover,
since Ψ(x) = 〈v(x)|p− x〉, setting t = tn in (D.6) yields
t−1n
∫ tn
0
Ψ(x(s)) ds = t−1n
∫ tn
0
〈v(x(s))|p− x(s)〉 ds = 〈v(x¯(tn))|p〉 − u¯(tn) (D.8)
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so limn→∞ t−1n
∫ tn
0
Ψ(x(s)) ds = 〈v(x¯∗)|p〉− u¯∗ > 0. This establishes (D.6) for large
enough t = tn, completing our proof. 
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